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WALTER J. WALSH*

Tyger! Tyger! burning bright
In the forest of the night,
What immortal hand or eye
Dare frame thy fearful symmetry? 1

A decade has now passed since Julia Cooper Mack authored her
most controversial judicial opinion, Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University.2 That

opinion provoked two acts of Congress aimed at its reversal, newspaper editorials from coast to coast, and over one hundred scholarly authors debating its wisdom. In this short essay, I shall suggest that this
extended hermeneutic debate has yet to touch upon the deepest implications of Judge Mack's Georgetown opinion. While recent scholarship on this story praises Judge Mack's unusual ability to reconcile
clashing interest groups, a more accurate account might be that she
never perceived any true clash of interests.

* Acting Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.C.L. 1979, National
University of Ireland (University College Dublin); LL.M. 1989, Yale Law School; S.J.D. 1997,

Harvard Law School. walshwj@u.washington.edu. The author clerked for Judge Mack from 1985
to 1987, and during that period assisted her in preparing the opinion discussed in this essay;

Professor Walsh has not discussed this article with Judge Mack prior to its submission, and no
views expressed herein should be imputed to Judge Mack other than those stated in her published opinions. This essay has benefitted greatly from earlier presentations to the Department

of Philosophy at the University of Washington; to LeGaLS at the University of Washington
School of Law; to BiLaGa at Georgetown University Law Center; and to the Critical Legal

Conference held at University College Dublin. Most of all, the author thanks his muse, Anita
Ramasastry.
1. WiLLIAM BLAKE, SONGS OF EXPERIENCE (1794).
2. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc).
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I. THE GEORGETOWN DECISION

This heated social conflict arose when two gay student groups
sought official recognition from Georgetown University, a Roman
Catholic institution. The ensuing highly-publicized controversy escalated through the 1980s to entangle the courts, local government, and
Congress. With the intrusion of Congress into this struggle between
gay equality and religious freedom, the issues expanded to include

questions on race and self-determination for the largely black District
of Columbia.
The lawsuit was filed in 1978 by two gay student groups at Ge-

orgetown University, the nation's oldest Roman Catholic University.
Invoking the District of Columbia's Human Rights Act-the first
state-level statute in the nation to outlaw sexual orientation discrimination-the students sought official recognition for their organizations.3 Pitted against the gay students' statutory antidiscrimination
claim was Georgetown University's constitutional freedom to express
its religious identity through student group recognition.4
The resulting protracted struggle's rich irony and paradox may be
appreciated from this series of partly hypothetical questions: Would a
Catholic school commit race discrimination by denying benefits to a
group of black students committed to violent revolution? Would it
commit gender discrimination by denying benefits to a group of women students devoted to abortion rights? Would the same Catholic
school commit sexual orientation discrimination by denying benefits
3. The District of Columbia Human Rights Act provided:
It is an unlawful discriminatory practice ... for an educational institution:
(1) To deny, restrict, or to abridge or condition the use of, or access to, any of its
facilities and services to any person otherwise qualified, wholly or partially, for a discriminatory reason, based upon the race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, political
affiliation, source of income or physical handicap of any individual ....
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520 (1992 & Supp. 1997).
It is the intent of the Council of the District of Columbia, in enacting this chapter,
to secure an end in the District of Columbia to discrimination for any reason other than
that of individual merit, including, but not limited to, discrimination by reason of [various characteristics including sexual orientation].
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2501 (1992 & Supp. 1997).
"'Sexual orientation' means male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality and bisexuality, by preference or practice."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502 (28) (1992 and Supp. 1997).
Other provisions apply the Human Rights Act's ban on sexual orientation discrimination to
employment, real estate transactions, and other areas of economic and social life.
4. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "Congress shall
make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]; or abridging the freedom of speech
U.S.
-....CONST. amend. I.
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to a group of gay students dedicated to promoting safe sex through
the responsible use of condoms? If the answer to these questions is
no, is this because the determining factor in those three decisions
would not be the race, gender, or sexual orientation, respectively, of
group members, but rather their particular collective ideologies?
What then of a more typical gay rights students group, where the students' collective ideology, which can perhaps be viewed at some level
as an immediate function of their sexual orientation, challenges elements of Catholic doctrine? When considering the relationship between protected individual status and shared group ideology, does
society fully respect the deliberate choice of many gay men and lesbians who live as devout Catholics-practicing celibacy according to official church teachings, just like the many unmarried Catholic
heterosexuals who also practice celibacy according to the same religious dogma? Is the charge of sexual orientation discrimination
weakened if the unrecognized student group's membership is not restricted to gay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals but is also open to
heterosexuals who accept certain values, including a belief in the
moral equivalence of homosexual intimacy? If a history of discrimination is relevant, does it matter that the recalcitrant school was
founded during a time when Catholics were routinely disenfranchised,
banned from public office, and forbidden to immigrate to an intolerant Protestant nation? Who is the aggressor in this unprecedented
conflict between private actors: is it the Catholic school that stigmatizes its gay students, or is it the gay students who invoke the power of
the state to dismantle a private religious community?
There was another irony. Without the direct involvement of the
University administration the gay student group had already won student body recognition, which conferred most campus benefits. Thus,
Georgetown was sued for opening its doors half-way to campus gay
rights groups-a gesture of tolerance that made Georgetown University the liberal vanguard on this issue in Catholic higher education.
This provoked the wrath of many conservative Catholics when other
Catholic colleges and universities were keeping their doors tightly
shut to gay student groups!
The District of Columbia government intervened to enforce its
Human Rights Act on behalf of the gay student groups. The trial
court declared that Georgetown University had indeed violated the
ban on sexual orientation discrimination, but then held that the statute was overbroad, as the university did nothing more than exercise its
1997]
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constitutionally protected freedom of religion.5 On appeal, this reasoning was reversed by a panel majority consisting of Judge John Ferret and Judge John Terry; Judge Julia Cooper Mack dissented from the
panel majority, unexpectedly calling for a completely new approach to
the conflict.6 In a rare move which signified the precedential importance of the case, an en banc rehearing was spontaneously ordered by
Court of Appeals, the highest court of the
the District of Columbia
7
District of Columbia.
Ten amicus curiae briefs were filed on both sides of the argument
from activist groups around the nation, including the Lambda Legal
Defense and Education Fund, the City of Seattle, the American Civil
Liberties Union, the State of Wisconsin, the Coalition for Religious
Freedom, the District of Columbia Bar, the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, and a roster of women's rights groups
led by the Women's Legal Defense Fund.8 The complexity of this unprecedented tug-of-war between newly-recognized gay rights and the
university's constitutional freedoms was underscored when the ACLU
split over the case. The national organization fied an amicus curiae
brief on behalf of the students written from an antidiscrimination perspective, while the head of the local chapter filed an opposing amicus
curiae brief emphasizing the private university's First Amendment
freedom to express its own communal religious values. 9
The final decision of the full District of Columbia Court of Appeals was handed down a decade ago, on November 20, 1987. In a
jurisprudential bazaar reminiscent of Lon Fuller's The Speluncean Explorers,'° each of the seven judges on the en banc court wrote a sepa5. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1,

14-16 (D.C. 1987) (en banc).
6. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 496 A.2d

567 (D.C. 1985); Id. at 582-87 (Mack, J., dissenting).
7. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 497 A.2d
587 (D.C. 1985) (en banc) (sua sponte order vacating panel opinion and setting case for rehearing en banc), replaced by 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en banc). The District of Columbia Court

Reorganization Act of 1970 provides that "The highest court of the District of Columbia is the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals." Pub. L. No. 91-358,84 Stat. 475 (codified at D.C. CODE
§ 11-102). The Court Reorganization Act also equates the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to state supreme courts for the jurisdictional purpose of federal Supreme Court review:
"For the purposes of this section, the term 'highest court of a State' includes the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals." Id. (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257). The House Report explains that
the court reorganization was intended to establish the District of Columbia Court of Appeals as
"the highest court in the jurisdiction, similar to a state supreme court." H.R. REP. No. 91-907, at
23 (1970).
8. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d at 3-4.
9. ACLU v. ACLU, 10 LEGAL TIMEs 3 (November 30, 1987).
10. Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARv. L. REv. 616 (1949).
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rate opinion. The lead opinion was written by Judge Mack, who
declared herself equally committed to the shared ideals of free religious expression and the antidiscrimination norm. She tried carefully
to distinguish between what is in the public and what is in the private
domain. This issue arose because the trial court had found as a matter
of fact that Georgetown University's particular scheme of official recognition included a religiously-based institutional endorsement of recipient student groups, along with certain additional benefits including
access to campus mailing services. 1
According to Judge Mack:
The distinction between the "endorsement" and the other benefits

contained in Georgetown's scheme of "University Recognition" is
fundamental. It is so from both a statutory and a constitutional perspective. In this case, the separateness of the benefits at issue is
obscured by the fact that they are bundled together into a single
package known as "University Recognition." Because the "endorsement" and the tangible benefits contained in that package are
fundamentally distinct, we must sever the artificial connection between them in order to analyze the true issues.12
Judge Mack elaborated: "The 'endorsement' contained in 'University
Recognition'... . is a symbolic gesture, a form of speech by a private,
religiously affiliated educational institution, an entity free to adopt
partisan public positions on moral and ethical issues. In speaking out
on human sexuality, Georgetown is guided by a religious mission undertaken along with secular educational functions.' 1 3 In contrast,
"[u]nlike the 'endorsement,' the tangible benefits are 'facilities and
services' [as covered by the D.C. Human Rights Act] and not an abstract expression of the University's moral philosophy. Their distinct
characteristics are disguised only because both the 'endorsement' and
the additional tangible benefits are included in one package known as
'University Recognition.""' 4 Hence, Judge Mack began her analysis,
"[w]e open up the package of 'University Recognition' and examine
its contents separately."' 5
Addressing first the threat of a compelled endorsement, Judge
Mack was joined by Chief Judge Pryor and Judges Newman, Belson,
and Nebeker in concluding that the District of Columbia's Human
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
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Rights Act could not be read to require any purely symbolic public
statement contrary to Georgetown's religious beliefs. A Roman Catholic school could not be forced to express moral neutrality towards a
student organization whose founding principles included "the development of responsible sexual ethics consonant with one's personal beliefs."' 6 Under Catholic doctrine, responsible sexual ethics are not a
question of personal belief but are subject to an explicit moral code
laid down by God. Under that moral code, sex is good only within
heterosexual marriage.' 7 The state could not force Georgetown University, a private religious community, to pledge publicly its tolerance
of any contrary and therefore repugnant moral belief. Any other interpretation of the statute would result in an unconstitutional invasion
of private freedom, wrote Judge Mack, citing a line of cases beginning
with the refusal of Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the American flag in
public schools. 8 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Mack quoted from
the first constitutional victory for religious freedom, an 1813 decision
argued as a test case on behalf of Irish Catholic refugees by the first
career civil rights lawyer in the United States-an Irish Protestant
who had rejected his place in the colonial ascendancy, and whose advocacy for equal rights for his indigenous Catholic compatriots had led
to his imprisonment, disbarment, and banishment by act of
attainder. 19
"Speech may no more be officially prescribed than it may be proscribed," wrote Judge Mack.2" "The Human Rights Act provides legal
mechanisms to ensure equality of treatment, not equality of attitudes."2 The trial court's interpretation of the statute, as requiring an
insincere expression of opinion, therefore conflicted with its most ba-

16. Id. at 8 n.5, 18 (quoting GPGU Constitution, Purpose #3).
17. Id. at 18-19.
18. Id. at 22-26 (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) and
later cases).
19. Id. at 22 n.18 (quoting People v. Philips (N.Y.Ct. Gen. Sess. June 14, 1813), reportedin,
WILLIAM SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTIoN IN AMERICA 114 (1813)). Since Judge Mack's
Georgetown opinion, several scholars have studied the Philipscase, which contradicts the constitutional historiography of free exercise exemptions recently relied on by the United States
Supreme Court. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
See Walter J. Walsh, Redefining Radicalism: An Historical Perspective, GEo. WASH. L. REv.
(1990); Walter J. Walsh, Religion, Ethnicity, and History-Clues to the Cultural Constructionof
Law, in Tir NEw YORK IRISH (Ronald H. Bayor & Timothy J. Meagher, eds., 1996).
20. 536 A.2d at 23.
21. Id. at 21.
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sic structure: "The Human Rights Act demands action, not words. It
was not intended to be an instrument of mind control." 22
Citing the provocative jurisprudential work of the late Professor
Robert Cover, Judge Mack indicated her concern for the flourishing
of communities committed to alternative moral visions of society.
"Georgetown's stock-in-trade is in ideas; as a private, nonprofit, religiously affiliated educational institution seeking to implement its own
vision of education, it is entitled to favor particular views on moral,
ethical, philosophical, political and social issues."' She distinguished
recent cases where government sought to regulate the speech of a
business corporation.24 Instead, the threat here was in "imposing official orthodoxy on controversial issues of religious, moral, ethical, and
philosophical importance, upon an entity whose role is to inquire into
such matters. The First Amendment not only ensures that questions
on difficult social topics be asked, it also forbids government from dictating the answers. '
"Georgetown's right to express opinions based on Roman Catholic teachings includes the right to do so by granting 'University Recognition' to groups it regards as consonant with that belief system,"
reasoned Judge Mack. "Individuals will not always agree with Georgetown's choices as to what groups are deserving of its approval, but
its right to freely express its views is nonetheless protected by the First
Amendment."' 26

Judge Mack offered a vivid and revealing illustration of such institutional autonomy to project normative communal values: "Freedom
of expression is a right to which we all lay equal claim, irrespective of
the content of our message. This is easily illustrated. Suppose that
the Gay University of America (GUA) is established as a private educational institution. Part of its mission is to win understanding and
acceptance of gay and bisexual persons in an intolerant society."'2 7
"Suppose also that GUA has the same system of 'University Recognition' as does Georgetown, through which it expresses its institutional
22. Id.

23. 536 A.2d at 24; see also id. at 20 n.15 (citing Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court1982
Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REv. 4 (1983), reprinted in NARRATrVE,
VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: Tim ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95-172 (Martha Minow et al. eds.,

1992).
24.
25.
26.
27.
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approval or tolerance of various student groups desiring that status."8
In such circumstances, just as Georgetown may withhold its official
recognition from its gay student groups despite the statutory ban on
sexual orientation discrimination, so too may GUA withhold its official recognition from Roman Catholic student groups despite the statutory ban on religious discrimination.2 9 Why? "[F]or the simple
reason that the statute does not require GUA to give expressions of
approval or tolerance. Insincere statements of opinion are not what
the Human Rights Act requires. On the other hand, the statute would
require equal distribution of any attendant tangible benefits if GUA's
denial of these was based on the religion of [student group] members.
Georgetown's protection against compelled expression is no more and
no less."3

Turning to the question of tangible benefits, Judge Mack was
joined by Chief Judge Pryor and Judges Newman, Ferren and Terry in
concluding that the District of Columbia's compelling interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination outweighed Georgetown's
religious interest in denying the gay student groups equal access to
campus facilities and services, including funding. Thus, although the
school was assured that it need not officially recognize the gay student
groups, "the District of Columbia's compelling interest in the eradication of sexual orientation discrimination outweighs any burden imposed upon Georgetown's exercise of religion by the forced equal
provision of tangible benefits."'"
The threshold question here was whether Georgetown had actually denied benefits based on the sexual orientation of its gay students,
as opposed to their organizational goals. Quoting from the university's correspondence with the student groups, Judge Mack found that
discrimination based on sexual orientation was manifest from the record, although perhaps only a subconscious factor in Georgetown's decision making.32 "By objecting to the student groups' assumed
connection, 'by definition,' to a 'full range of issues' associated with
the 'gay movement,' rather than to specific 'purposes and activities'
inconsistent with its Roman Catholic tradition," wrote Judge Mack,
"Georgetown engaged in the kind of stereotyping unrelated to indi28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 25-26. The facts of Judge Mack's GUA hypothetical mirror those found at Georgetown University. See id. at 5-10 & nn. 4-6.

31. Id. at 5.
32. Id. at 26-30.
[VOL.
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vidual merit that is forbidden by the Human Rights Act." For her, the
record revealed no genuine doubt that "Georgetown's asserted nondiscriminatory basis for its action was in fact tainted by certain
preconceptions about gay persons. Georgetown did not apply its
'Recognition Criteria' on an equal basis to all groups without regard
to the sexual orientation of their members.""3
This statutory violation based on sexual orientation discrimination set the stage for the holding that made Gay Rights Coalition of
Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University a nationally-watched case: Did the District of Columbia have a compelling
interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination of sufficient
constitutional strength to overcome asserted First Amendment defenses, like the constitutional paradigms of race and gender discrimination? Quoting Supreme Court precedent to the effect that only
social "interests of the highest and most pressing order can overbalance legitimate claims to free religious exercise," 4 Judge Mack declared, "[w]e conclude that the District of Columbia's stake in the
35
eradication of sexual orientation discrimination is one such interest.
Judge Mack opened her inquiry into the existence of a constitutionally compelling interest in the eradication of sexual orientation
discrimination by looking at the legislative intent behind the District
of Columbia's pioneering Human Rights Act. She described the statute's premise that:
a person's sexual orientation, like a person's race and sex, for example, tells nothing of value about his or her attitudes, characteristics,
abilities or limitations. It is a false measure of individual worth, one
unfair and oppressive to the person concerned, one harmful to
inflicts a grave and recurring injury
others because discrimination
6
upon society as a whole?
Moreover, outlawing sexual orientation discrimination was essential
to any comprehensive equality theory: "Only by eradicating discrimination based on sexual orientation, along with all other forms of discrimination unrelated to individual merit, could the District eliminate
recurrent personal injustice and build a society which encourages and
expects the full contribution of every member of the community in all
'37
their diversity and potential.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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Relying on materials that were presented neither at trial nor in
the appellate briefs, Judge Mack considered the District of Columbia's
legislative determination sufficiently weighty to overcome constitutional defenses. "A homosexual orientation tells nothing reliable
about abilities or commitments in work, religion, politics, personal
and social relationships, or social activities, except to the extent that in
many areas the lives of gay people are frequently conditioned by the
attitudes of others."3 Nevertheless, "[d]espite its irrelevance to individual merit, a homosexual or bisexual orientation invites ongoing
prejudice in all walks of life, ranging from employment to education,
and for most of which there is currently no judicial remedy outside the
District of Columbia or the State of Visconsin." 3 9 As Judge Mack
observed,40 "[s]uch discrimination has persisted throughout most of
history.
Homophobia displays itself in different forms. "Erupting into violence, social prejudice sometimes takes the form of unprovoked attacks on those perceived to be gay."'" Anticipating a literary
argument recently proposed by Kenyi Yoshino, Judge Mack explicitly
invoked the symbolism of the pink triangle: "In perhaps its most virulent form, prejudice against gay people led to the Nazi concentration
camps. There, homosexual prisoners were distinguished, like their unfortunate fellows, by a cloth badge, in their case one which singled
them out for unusual atrocities."'4
While asserting independent state grounds to support the District
of Columbia's compelling interest in eradicating sexual orientation
discrimination, Judge Mack also directly tied her methodology in disposing of strong First Amendment defenses to an affirmative Fourteenth Amendment federal equal protection analysis: "Although by
no means a prerequisite to our conclusion of a compelling governmental interest, we note parenthetically that sexual orientation appears to
possess most or all of the characteristics that have persuaded the
Supreme Court to apply strict or heightened constitutional scrutiny to
38. Id. at 35.
39. Id. Since Judge Mack wrote this, the District of Columbia and the State of Wisconsin
have been joined by nine other states in outlawing sexual orientation. See infra notes 62-65.
40. Id. at 36.
41. 536 A.2d at 35-36.
42. Id. at 36 (citing Lautman, The Pink Triangle-The Persecutionof Homosexual Males in
Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany, in HISTORICAL PERSPECrrvEs oN HoMosaxuALrrv (S.
Licata & R. Petersen eds. 1981)); see also Kenyi Yoshino, Note, Suspect Symbols: The Literary
Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. Rn-v. 1753 (1996).
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legislative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause."'43 Available evidence suggests that sexual orientation is determined by causes

not within the individual's control, and not generally subject to
change; that it invites stereotyping regardless of individual abilities;
that there is a long and unfortunate history of discrimination based on
sexual orientation; and that due to continuing legal and social stigma,
homosexual and bisexual persons constitute discrete and insular minorities whose interests are unprotected by political processes.'
"The eradication of sexual orientation discrimination is a compelling governmental interest."'4 Consequently, "[t]he University's free
exercise defense does not exempt it from compliance with the statute,

because the District of Columbia's compelling interest in eradicating
sexual orientation discrimination outweighs any burden that equal
provision of the tangible benefits would impose on Georgetown's religious exercise.""

Five of the seven judges held that Georgetown need not officially
recognize the gay student groups because its particular scheme of offi-

cial recognition included a religiously guided endorsement. A different five judge majority held that Georgetown must treat the gay
student groups absolutely equally in every other respect. Although

Georgetown's symbolic expression was not mandated by the Human
Rights Act, equal access to tangible benefits was required by the District's compelling constitutional interest in eradicating sexual orienta43. 536 A.2d 36-37.
44. Id. at 31-39. Curiously, despite the multitude of briefs filed in this case, none supplied
the court with the extensive social science research that underlay the compelling interest/suspect
classification conclusion in Judge Mack's opinion. Instead, gay rights advocates simply analogized sexual orientation discrimination to decided precedents establishing constitutionally compelling governmental interests in eradicating race and gender discrimination; the vacated panel
majority opinion also adopted this approach. 496 A.2d at 575-76. By treating all forms of statutory discrimination as indistinguishable, this methodology contemplates no greater constitutional
latitude for religious believers to shun others for sincere reasons unrelated to race, gender, or
sexual orientation. For example, in the District of Columbia, a person may not be discriminated
against due to "political affiliation" or "source of income" (both of which are protected by the
District of Columbia's antidiscrimination statute), and in the State of Wisconsin a person may
not be discriminated against due to a "prior criminal record" (protected by the State of Wisconsin's antidiscrimination statute). Popular reactions against gay rights measures over the past few
years demonstrate the importance of Judge Mack's approach, which in cases of conflict discharges a vital judicial responsibility to articulate precisely the reasons why previously unregulated forms of discrimination-such as that based on sexual orientation-are indeed invidious.
See generally Jeffrey J.W. Baker, Sexuality, Science and Social Responsibility-The Georgetown
Scandal, 20 J. SEx Rrs. 210 (1984); Patricia J. Falk, The Prevalence of Social Science in Gay
Rights Cases: The Synergistic Influences of HistoricalContext, Justificatory Citation, and Dissemination Efforts, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 10 n.34 (1994).
45. 536 A.2d at 38.
46. Id. at 39.
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tion discrimination, an interest strong enough to overcome First
Amendment defenses.
In hindsight, it can now be said that Judge Mack's opinion in Gay
Rights Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown
University was at least a decade ahead of its time. After argument
before the full District of Columbia Court of appeals, and while the
Georgetown decision was being prepared, the Supreme Court decided
Bowers v. Hardwick.4 7 That decision rejected federal constitutional
due process privacy attacks on state sodomy statutes. The year after
Bowers, Judge Mack's Georgetown decision nevertheless held that
states have a constitutionally compelling governmental interest in
eradicating sexual orientation discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Mack reasoned that for Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection purposes official classifications based on homosexuality
should be considered suspect, and therefore subject to strict or heightened constitutional scrutiny.48 Judge Mack's Georgetown decision
thus became the first appellate decision to extend federal constitutional equal protection doctrine to gay men and lesbians, and to this
day it remains the only authoritative judicial precedent to so hold. In
the words of the gay students' trial lawyer Ronald Bogard, "the tree
is bearing fruit. The precedent of Georgetown is bigger than Georgetown, and we knew it would be."4 9
Perhaps, but counselor Bogard's prophecy has not yet come to
pass. Heavily influenced by Bowers, every other higher court confronted with the issue has ultimately rejected or declined direct invitations to treat homosexuality as a suspect classification for federal
equal protection purposes. With the conspicuous exception of Judge
Mack's Georgetown decision (together with an unappealed Florida
trial court ruling in Seebol, and a recent federal district court ruling in
Able which is currently on appeal), the scattered holdings that briefly
stalled this conservative trend in equal protection theory have all been
reversed or vacated. Those short-lived trial or appellate court holdings were Watkins, Ben-Shalom, High Tech Gays, Jantz, Equality
Foundation,and Cox."0 Strangely, of those several short lived consti47. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
48. 536 A.2d at 36-37.
49. Daniel Klaidman, "Insulting and Intimidating",11 LEGAL TIMES 1, June 20, 1988 (Ronaid Bogard had quit his job as a government attorney to work probono full time on the Georgetown litigation).
50. Apart from Georgetown, all other higher courts (lately relying on Bowers v. Hardwick)
have ultimately rejected or declined invitations to treat homosexuality as a suspect or quasi-
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tutional rulings for gay equality, only Judge Canby in his High Tech
Gays dissent briefly noted Judge Mack's powerful Georgetown

opinion.-"
In the most recent cases following Bowers, often involving equal
protection challenges within the military, vulnerable gay and lesbian
litigants have been driven to the forlorn strategy of arguing that

homophobic discrimination is irrational, while simultaneously conceding the illegality of homosexual conduct. Ironically enough, the few
courts persuaded by this desperate argument have taken a position
essentially indistinguishable from the theological stance long held by
suspect classification for federal equal protection purposes. The principal cases are the
following.
Only Georgetown and two later trial court opinions still stand for the proposition that sexual
orientation is a suspect classification warranting strict scrutiny for equal protection purposes.
See Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d I (D.C.
1987) (en banc) (adopting suspect classificationtstrict scrutiny equal protection analysis to establish that government has compelling constitutional interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination); Seebol v. Farie (Fla. 16th Cir. Ct. Mar. 15, 1991) (adopting suspect classificationl
strict scrutiny equal protection analysis in unreported opinion which was not appealed, but was
summarized at 16 FLA. L. WE-KLY C52, and at 17 FAm. L. REp. (BNA) 1331, and was later
reprinted in full as an appendix to an intermediate appellate court opinion in Department of
Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Cox, 627 So.2d 1210, Appendix A at 1220-21,1225-26 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1993)); Able v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 850, 852-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (adopting
suspect classification/strict scrutiny equal protection analysis, currently on appeal to Second
Circuit).
Another six cases, all subsequent to Georgetown, once stood for the same proposition, but
all have since been vacated or reversed: Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of
Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261,266-68,270-71 (6th Cir. 1995) (reversing trial court's quasi-suspect classification/intermediate scrutiny equal protection analysis at 860 F. Supp. 417, 422, 429, 434-44, 449
(S.D. Ohio 1994)), judgment vacated and remanded, 116 S.Ct. 2519 (1996); Jantz v. Muci, 976
F.2d 623, 627-30 (10th Cir. 1992) (reversing trial court's suspect classification/strict scrutiny equal
protection analysis at 759 F. Supp. 1543, 1545-53 (D. Kan. 1991)), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 952
(1993); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 704, 711 (9th Cir. 1989) (en bane) (declining to adopt suspect classification/strict scrutiny equal protection analysis proposed by Norris &
Canby, JJ., in concurrence at 875 F.2d at 711-12, 716-28, 731, and in vacated panel opinion at 847
F.2d 1329, 1335-36, 1339-49, 1352-62 (1989)); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 463-66 (7th
Cir. 1989) (reversing trial court's suspect classification/strict scrutiny equal protection analysis at
703 F. Supp. 1372, 1377-80 (E.D. Wis. 1989)), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990); Cox v. Dep't of
Health and Rehabilitative Services, 656 So.2d 902-03 (Fla. 1995) (remanding for evidentiary
hearing trial court's suspect classification/strict scrutiny equal protection analysis in unreported
opinion summarized by intermediate appellate court at 627 So.2d 1210, 1217-20 (Fla. Ct. App.
1993), upon this remand the lesbian plaintiff abandoned her suit, see Tiffani G. Lee, Note, Cox v.
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services: A Challenge to Florida'sHomosexualAdoption Ban, 51 U. MiAim L. Rnv. 151, 164-67 & n.127 (1996)); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus.
Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 570-74 (reversing trial court's quasi-suspect classification/
intermediate scrutiny equal protection analysis at 668 F. Supp. 1361, 1368-77 (N.D. Cal. 1987)),
reh'gen banc denied, 909 F.2d 375 (9th Cir. 1990) (declining to adopt suspect classification/strict
scrutiny equal protection analysis proposed by Canby & Norris, JJ., in dissent at 909 F.2d at 37582).
51. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 909 F.2d 375, 377 (9' Cir.
1990) (Norris, J., joined by Camby, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
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the Catholic church: that a homosexual orientation is neutral and
without "moral" condemnation, but that acting out such inclinations
through homosexual conduct is "sinful" and thereby subject to appropriate sanctions. As a constitutional argument for gay equality, this
reasoning is clearly disastrous, promising at best a pyrrhic victory.
Gay rights advocates and sympathetic judges-including those in
Able, the latest case to test the suspect classification theory-have
therefore been gravely remiss in their failure to press the full precedential weight and radical implications offered by Judge Mack's Georgetown opinion. Her lonely precedent is much more in tune with
current legal scholarship than with prevailing judicial discourse
(although here too the Georgetown decision is often overlooked by
academic writers).5'
Meanwhile, since Bowers the Supreme Court has become much
more ambivalent on the constitutionality of sexual orientation discrimination. One cryptic decision is Hurley v. Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston,5 3 authored by Justice David
Souter, in which first amendment principles stood in the way of a sexual orientation antidiscrimination statute invoked by gay marchers
barred from Boston's St. Patrick's Day Parade. A more forceful decision is Romer v. Evans,5 4 in which the Supreme Court-without any
mention of Bowers!-struck down as irrational a statewide constitutional initiative forbidding localities from adopting such sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws. The Supreme Court's new concern for
gay men and lesbians can be read as a silent overruling of Bowers
because the outright criminalization of homosexual conduct is an even
52. See Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution:Homosexual Personsas
Discreteand InsularMinority, 10 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. RE'. 143 (1988); Patricia Cain, Litigatingfor
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. Rav. 1551 (1993); Fernando J. Gutierrez,
Gay and Lesbian: An Ethnic Identity Deserving Equal Protection, 4 J.L. & SaxuAirrY 195
(1994); John Charles Hayes, The Traditionof Prejudice Versus the Principleof Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal ProtectionScrutiny afterBowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REv. 375
(1990); Nan Hunter, Life after Hardwick, 27 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rtv. 531 (1992); Renee
Culverhouse & Christine Lewis, Homosexuality as a Suspect Class, 34 S. TEx. L. Rv. 205
(1993); Bobbi Bernstein, Power, Prejudice, and the Right to Speak: Litigating "Outness" Under
the Equal ProtectionClause, 47 STAN. L. Rav. 269 (1995); Eric A. Roberts, HeightenedScrutiny
Under the Equal ProtectionClause: A Remedy to DiscriminationBased on Sexual Orientation,42
DRAKE L. Rav. 485 (1995); Kenyi Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The LiteraryArgument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1753 (1996); Harris M. Miller, Note, An Argument
for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 So. CAL- L. Rtv. 791, 797 (1984); Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification,98 HIAqv. L. REv. 1285 (1985).
53. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
54. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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more direct attack on their identity than the bigoted measure struck
down in Romer.5 5 But after Romer, the Supreme Court has yet to
address the lingering constitutional equal protection issue directly by
identifying the appropriate standard of review that should govern sexual orientation discrimination. Romer is undoubtedly a step away
from Bowers, but the Court moved in an unanticipated direction without addressing Georgetown's suspect classification equal protection
analysis. Relying instead on an equal protection theory that no group
can rationally be politically stigmatized, the Romer Court refused to
accept the conservative characterization of gay rights ordinances as
special privileges rather than equality measures.56
Professor William Eskridge points out that shortly before Judge
Mack's Georgetown opinion, strong early support for treating gay people equally appeared in Justice Brennan's dissent in Rowland v. Mad
5 7 Noting that sex and race discrimination
River Local School District.
already warrant special constitutional status, Justice Brennan laid out
a persuasive case for devoting equal public concern to sexual orientation discrimination. "Judge Mack's opinion in the Georgetown case
developed a more detailed case for that proposition," continues Professor Eskridge, "an argument that went unchallenged in the otherwise compendious concurring in part and dissenting in part
opinions."58
The antidiscrimination argument for gay equality is tested to the
limit when it is counterbalanced by competing constitutional ideals.
After Bowers, Hurley, and now Romer, asks Professor Eskridge, could
a Supreme Court majority still adopt the Brennan-Mack position that
gay men and lesbians are constitutionally entitled to the same equal
protection as blacks and women? "An important question is whether
Hurley, which is now the leading Supreme Court precedent [on conflicts between gay equality and freedom of association], overrules Gay
Rights Coalition a lower court decision operative only in the District
of Columbia."5 9 Professor Eskridge weighs the argument that Hurley
has overturned Gay Rights Coalition but concludes that the two cases
55. See Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished,68 U. COLO. L. Rlv. 373 (1997).
56. Romer v. Evans, 116 S.Ct.1620, 1624-29 (1996).
57. William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality,
and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L. 1. 2411, 2460
(1997)(citing 470 U.S. 1009, 1011-17 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari))
[hereinafter Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out"].
58. Id. at 2460.
59. Id. at 2462.
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can be distinguished, partly because elsewhere "Justice Souter was
open to the sort of dialogic accommodation, encompassing tangible
benefits but not official recognition, that Mack crafted in the Georgetown case."6 Furthermore, adds Professor Eskridge, "[tihe
Supreme Court's decision in Romer v. Evans suggests that the Brennan-Mack position has some resonance with six Justices on the current
Court, one of whom wrote Hurley and all of whom joined it without
reservation. ' 61 In short, despite its continuing judicial isolation, Judge
Mack's sexual orientation equal protection argument in Georgetown
may yet spark off a twenty-first century gay rights jurisprudence in the
Supreme Court.
Moreover, as local gay rights ordinances continue to proliferate
after Romer, the idea of stronger statewide protections against sexual
orientation discrimination has gained growing legislative acceptance.
The first state-level sexual orientation antidiscrimination statute was
adopted by the District of Columbia in 1977 (when the Council put
the Human Rights Act later invoked in the Georgetown litigation onto
full statutory footing, thus strengthening a city ordinance adopted four
years earlier).62 Following the District of Columbia's lead, the State
of Wisconsin adopted the second American state-level statute outlawing sexual orientation discrimination in 1982.63 The third such statute
was passed by Massachusetts in 1989. 4 Since then, these three have
been followed by Connecticut (1991), Hawaii (1991), California
(1992), New Jersey (1992), Vermont (1992), Minnesota (1993), Rhode
Island (1995), and New Hampshire (1998) making a current total of 11
state-level statutes that include sexual orientation together with other
protected categories. Moreover, over 150 municipalities nationwide
have adopted ordinances outlawing sexual orientation discrimination,
and Congress is now considering federal protection in employment on
that ground. 65 During a roughly similar period, the number of state
60. Id. at 2463 (citing New York State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1 (1987)), as distinguished by Justice Souter in his majority opinion in Hurley v. Irish-American
Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 580 (1995)).

61. Id. at 2460.
62. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1981 & Supp. 1997).

63. Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 66.432, 111.31 (West 1996).
64. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 4, ch. 272, § 98 (West 1992 & Supp. 1997).
65. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 4a-60a, 46a-81c, 46a-81e (West 1995 & Supp. 1997); HAW.
REv. STAT. § 368.1 (Michie 1994); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-12, 11A:7-1 (West 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 961, tit. 8, §§ 1211, 1302, 4724, tit. 9,

§§ 2410, 2488, 4502, 4503, tit. 21, §§ 495, 1726 (1987 & Supp. 1997); MNiNN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01
to 363.20 (West 1991 & Supp. 1997); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-5-5, 28-5-7,28-5-41, 34-37-1 (1995 &

Supp. 1996); N.H. House Bill 421, 1997 N.H. Laws ch. 108, approved June 9, 1997 (effective Jan.
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statutes criminalizing homosexual conduct has steadily fallen; in force

1960, lingering sodomy statutes
throughout the United States until
66
have now dropped to twenty one.

With some exceptions, this growing legislative support for gay
and lesbian equality has not been replicated by the American judiciary. In addition to Judge Mack's Georgetown decision and Romer,
Gay rights advocates have won a few important judicial rulings based
on state guarantees of constitutional equality. In Gay Law Students v.

Pacific Tel. & Tel.,67 the California Supreme Court upheld an equal
protection argument in employment invoking the California state constitution. In Commonwealth v. Wasson,68 the Kentucky Supreme
Court relied partly on equal protection theory in striking down the
state sodomy statute under the state's constitution. In Baehr v. Miike,69 the Hawaii Supreme Court, relying on its state constitution's
prohibition on gender discrimination, invalidated the state's refused to

recognize same sex marriages. Moreover, there is now a growing
body of authoritative precedent declaring that criminal sodomy statutes offend state obligations under international human rights
conventions.7 0
The American law on gay equality is presently incoherent. Traditional proscriptions against homosexual conduct now exist side-byside with new rights against sexual orientation discrimination, frequently in the same jurisdiction. In a fascinating jurisprudential shift,
1, 1998). For a useful table setting out details of these statutes, together with state executive
orders and local ordinances, see Note, ConstitutionalLimits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives,106
HAxv. L. Rav. 1905, 1923 (1993); see also Nan Hunter et al., THE RIGHTS OF LESBIANS AND
GAY MEN: Tim BAsic AcLu GUIDE TO A GAY PERSON'S RIGHTS (3rd ed. 1992).

66. ALA. CODE § 13A-6-65 (a)(3) (1994); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. s. 13-1411 (West 1989);
Aax. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West Supp. 1995); GA.

CODE AxN.§ 16-6-2 (Supp. 1995); Id. CODE § 18-6605 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANr.§ 21-3505 (1993);
LA. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 14:89 (West 1986); MAss. GEN. L. c-. 272 §§ 34-35 (1992); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, §§ 553-54 (1996); Micff. STAT. Aim.§ 28.355 (1990); MNN. STAT. ANN. § 609.293
(West 1987); Mss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1973); Mo. REv. STAT. § 566.090 (Supp. 1995);
MONT. CODE ANN.§ 45-5-505 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 14-177 (1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 886
(Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-403 (1995); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-361 (Miechie Supp. 1995).
67. 595 P.2d 592 (1979).
68. 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). A similar holding was recently handed down by a Tennessee
intermediate appellate court. Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996).
69. 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996); see also, Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). For an
earlier unsuccessful effort to accomplish this result in the District of Columbia, relying on the
Georgetown precedent, see Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995).
70. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. a) (1981); Norris v. Ireland, 142
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. a) (1988); Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. a) (1993).
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it is at least conceivable that these new state and perhaps even federal
antidiscrimination statutes protecting sexual orientation may soon
outnumber those older statutes that still criminalize homosexual sodomy. As once universal statutory proscriptions against sodomy fall at
one end, and as state and federal statutory antidiscrimination provisions and constitutional protections rise at the other, society may be
on an ideological see-saw: the social ideal of full gay equality that was
unthinkable to the last generation may be taken for granted by the
next. If this does indeed happen, Judge Mack's Georgetown opinion
will no longer be viewed as an isolated and idiosyncratic precedent,
but will rather be recognized as an historic constitutional landmark.
Such too will be the fate of the District of Columbia's pioneering sexual orientation antidiscrimination statute, which Judge Mack found
supported by a compelling constitutional interest in the eradication of
sexual orientation discrimination.
II.

SCHOLARLY REACTIONS TO THE GEORGETOWN
DECISION

Soon after its publication, Judge Mack's Georgetown opinion
drew a flurry of scholarly reaction. At the center of this discourse, a
cluster of pieces have been written exclusively or primarily on the Georgetown gay rights conflict. To date, a score of scholarly articles and
book chapters have focused primarily on some aspect of the Georgetown decision, including one which dealt mainly with the District
of Columbia Council's resulting litigation to prevent Congress from
71
interfering with the Human Rights Act as judicially interpreted.
Pieces inspired by the decision include theoretical works by William Eskridge and Gary Peller;72 two highly detailed jurisprudential
case studies by Professor Linda Lacey and Professor Fernand Dutile,7 3
and two similarly painstaking student analyses by Paul O'Connell and
71. For a useful but incomplete introduction, see Sexual Orientationand the Law: A Selective Bibliography on Homosexuality and the Law, 1969-1993, 86 L. LIBR. J. 1, 95 (1994).
72. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57 at 2411; WiLLIAM N. ESKRImGE, Normative Theories of Interpretation,in DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 174
(1994) [hereinafter ESKIRDGE, DYNAMc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION]; William N. Eskridge &
Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation as a Postmodem CulturalForm, 89
MIcH. L. Rav. 707 (1991) (published in symposium on "The New Public Law Movement")
[hereinafter Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement].
73. Fernand N. Dutile, God and Gays at Georgetown: Observationson Gay Rights Coalition
of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 15 J.C. & U.L. 1 (1988); Linda J.
Lacey, Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University: Constitutional Values on a Collision

Course, 64 OR. L. Rv. 409 (1986).
[VOL.

40:513

Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and Racial Equality
Brent Thompson;7 4 a laconic essay on constitutional realism authored
by Professor Mark Tushnet,75 and two openly polemical articles written from an entirely opposed perspective by constitutional commentators Professor Joseph Broadus and Professor Peter Ferrara;7 6 a pair of
essays written by political scientists Professor Virginia Nordin and
Professor Jo Renee Formicola, 7 and another by social scientist Professor Jeffrey J.W. Baker;7 8 a revealing institutional statement authored by a principal protagonist in the conflict, Georgetown's
President Timothy Healy, S.J.;7 9 a student contribution to the legal
history of gay rights by and Lorena Dumas;8 0 and another student
piece by Steven Sherr which examines the Georgetown decision's
political and juridical aftermath in a detailed analysis of the ensuing
Armstrong Amendment litigation."'
A considerable number of scholars have adverted to the Georgetown decision more generally in the course of advancing often discordant propositions. Before examining some of the scholarship that
analyzes Judge Mack's controversial opinion in depth, it may be helpful to survey the varied contexts in which her opinion has been inyoked more broadly, illustrating the infinite array of hermeneutic
possibilities offered by judicial expression.
Over the last two decades, legal and constitutional doctrine in the
area of gay rights has been under considerable strain, on such issues as
the constitutionality of remaining sodomy statutes, the military exclu74. Paul E. O'Connell, Comment, Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University: Failure
to Recognize a Catholic University's Religious Liberty, 32 CATH. LAW. 170 (1988); Brent T.
Thompson, Casenote, A Retrospective Look at Gay Rights Coalitionv. Georgetown University, 1
GEo. MASON U. Crv. Rs. L.J. 121 (1990).
75. Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REv. 117, 127-40

(1993).

76. Peter Ferrara & Joseph Broadus, The Church and Gay Rights, BosTrON PILOT, MAR. 11,
1988, reprinted in 7 FUND. J. 61 (1988); Joseph Broadus, Georgetown: A Portent of Future
Church-State Relations, Tim WANDERER, Mar. 17, 1988, reprinted in 135 CONG. REC S11109

(daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989).
77. Jo Renee Formicola, The Gays, Georgetown, and the Government, in

CHURCH POLITY

AND AmEicAN PoLITIcs 233 (M. Segers ed. 1990); Virginia Davis Nordin, GRC v. Georgetown:

Autonomy and Nondiscrimination,5 THouHr & ACTIoN 37 (1989).
78. Jeffrey J.W. Baker, Sexuality, Science and Social Responsibility-The Georgetown Scandal, 20 J. SEx REs. 210 (1984).
79. Timothy S. Healy, Letter to the Alumni and Faculty of Georgetown University, reprinted
in 158 AM. 455 (Apr. 30, 1988), 134 CONG. REc. 89114 (daily ed. July 8, 1988), and 135 CONG.
REc. S11109 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989).
80. Lorena Dumas, Comment, The Sexual Orientation Clause of the Districtof Columbia's
Human Rights Act, 1 L. & SEXUALITY 267 (1991).

81. Steven N. Sherr, Note, Freedom and Federalism: The FirstAmendment's Protection of
Legislative Voting, 101 YALE L.J. 233 (1991).
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sion of openly gay personnel, the scope of laws forbidding sexual orientation discrimination and the propriety of conservative reactions
against such laws, the rights of gay and lesbian couples to raise their
children, and the constitutionality of heterosexual-only marriage laws
which were recently overturned in Hawaii. Several scholars have perceived the Georgetown decision as a landmark in the development of
this emerging gay rights jurisprudence.8" According to the wellknown English natural law philosopher, John Finnis, Judge Mack's
Georgetown opinion has had international jurisprudential reverberations.8 3 The reception has been controversial.
According to Professor Finnis, the "standard modern position" is
a prevailing European norm which forbids discrimination against individuals based upon their private sexual preferences.8 4 While this approach does indeed require the decriminalization of private
homosexual conduct, it does not follow that the state must equate homosexuality with heterosexuality as equivalent normative lifestyles.
Going far beyond the "standard modern position," continues Professor Finnis, are radically equivocal laws outlawing "discrimination
based upon sexual orientation"-equivocal because they can be read
to extend full legal protection to public activities intended specifically
to promote, procure and facilitate homosexual conduct.
"It has been noticed in public circles in Europe," writes Professor
Finnis, "that such laws have indeed been interpreted by American
courts as having just such an implication."8 6
An example which has been widely reported is the Georgetown
University case, requiring a religiously affiliated educational institution to give equal access to its facilities to organizations "participating in and promoting homosexual lifestyles [which necessarily
include homosexual conduct]" in manifest opposition to the moral
the religion with which that institution probeliefs and teachings of
87
fessed an association.
82. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet: Establishing
Conditions for Lesbian and Gay Intimacy, Nomos, and Citizenship, 1961-81, 25 HoFsrnA L.
Rnv. 817, 882-83 (1997) [hereinafter Eskridge, Challengingthe Apartheid of the Closet].
83. John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation", 69 NoTn DAME L. Rtv.
1049, 1053 (1994); John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation",9 NoRE DAME J.L.
ETmIcs & PuB. POL'Y 11, 15 (1995).

84. John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation", 69 NoTRn
1049, 1053 (1994).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.

DAME L. REv.
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According to Finnis, Judge Mack's radical step beyond the "standard
modem position" means that law no longer teaches that homosexual
conduct is bad, but rather that it is a type of sexual activity as good as
any other.88 Hence, reasons Finnis, Judge Mack's Georgetown opinion necessarily "requires prompt abandonment of all attempts by the
political community to discourage homosexual conduct by means of
educational policies, restrictions on prostitution, non-recognition of
homosexual 'marriages' and adoptions, and so forth." 89 Professor Finnis and other socially conservative scholars find that the Georgetown
decision should therefore dissuade states from enacting sexual orientation antidiscrimination statutes at all. 90
Professor Larry Cata Backer, a scholar who is committed to gay
rights, joins Professor Finnis in drawing this sharp jurisprudential distinction between laws that merely tolerate private homosexual behavior, as opposed to those that publicly equate heterosexual and
homosexual behavior as normatively equivalent. But in marked contrast to Professor Finnis, Professor Backer concludes that the state can
no longer defensibly maintain the discriminatorily ambivalent position
expressed by mere tolerance. 91
As already illustrated, the Georgetown case demonstrates that
two conceptually distinct constitutional arguments for gay rights run
parallel. Litigants may challenge hostile state action under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, often arguing that
governmental classifications based on sexual orientation should be
treated as constitutionally suspect, a theory which would subject such
official distinctions to strict or heightened judicial scrutiny. But an
even more sweeping antidiscrimination argument can arise when a
sympathetic state affirmatively adopts legislation outlawing even private sexual orientation discrimination. In such circumstances, the
state may need to enforce its antidiscrimination law over First
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation,
PublicPolicy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 396 n.10, 436-38, 443 n.218
(1994); Lincoln C. Oliphant, What Churches Can Expect from "Gay Rights" Laws: A Preview of
Iowa's Sexual Orientation Bill, 33 CATH.LAW. 87, 96-107 (1990). Curiously, a student writer
discusses this precise topic at some length with only a cursory reference to the Georgetown decision, the only authority directly on point. David B. Cruz, Note, Piety and Prejudice:Free Exercise Exemption from Laws ProhibitingSexual OrientationDiscrimination,69 N.Y.U. L. Rlv.
1176, 1177 n.6, 1189 n.65, 1237 (1994).
91. Larry Cata Backer, Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalizationof
Private Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration, 45 FLA.
L. REv. 755, 801 n.190, 802 (1993).
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Amendment objections based on the Free Exercise Clause or Free
Speech Clause. In order to overcome such constitutional defenses, officials may be required to show that their statute advances a compel-

ling governmental interest in outlawing sexual orientation
discrimination-a constitutional standard which effectively collapses
the First Amendment inquiry into the Fourteenth Amendment equal

protection analysis.

2

One factor which has traditionally been considered in determining whether a social group is constitutionally recognized under equal

protection analysis is whether its members voluntarily adopt their distinguishing characteristics. In this area, the Georgetown litigation has

been viewed as a crucible for epistemological inquiry.93 One commentator sympathetic to gay rights views Judge Mack's Georgetown

opinion as overly reliant on the strategically and empirically problematic assumption that sexual orientation is an inherent and immutable

human trait, rather than simply a fundamentally private personal
choice. 94 This implication of the decision has been more warmly received by other scholars with extensive experience litigating gay rights
issues such as the staff at the Lambda Legal Defense Fund and

ACLU.95 In a novel argument that was almost unthinkable when the
Georgetown Decision was handed down, the reasoning has been inyoked as an alternative (or perhaps unstated) rationale for constitu-

92. Harris M. Miller, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened Scrutiny to ClassificationsBased on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAT. L. REv. 797, 835 n.232
(1984). In one garbled early analysis, student writers ignored Judge Mack's explicit finding that
governmental classifications based on sexual orientation should be subjected to strict scrutiny for
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection purposes. Note, Developments in the Law-Sexual
Orientation and the Law, 102 HARv. L. Rnv. 1507, 1668-71 (1989). A more reliable analysis of
the Georgetown decision has since appeared in the same journal. Note, Developments in the
Law-Employment Discrimination,109 HARV. L. REv. 1567, 164047 (1996).
93. See Jeffrey J.W. Baker, Sexuality, Science and Social Responsibility-The Georgetown
Scandal,20 J. SEx REs. 210 (1984); see also Patricia J. Falk, The Prevalence of Social Science in
Gay Rights Cases: The Synergistic Influences of Historical Context, Justificatory Citation, and
Dissemination Efforts, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 10 n.34 (1994) (surveying judicial methodology in

this area).
94. Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protectionfor Gay, Lesbian,
and Bisexual Identity, 26 UCLA L. REv. 915, 922 n.22 (1989). I regard Judge Mack's opinion as
somewhat more open on this issue than does Professor Halley. It is helpful to recall that antidiscrimination laws also protect religious believers, who can always change their faith and still be
protected provided their conversion is sincere.
95. Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Rnv. 531, 552 n.83 (1992);
Evan Wolfson & Robert S. Mower, When the PoliceAre in Our Bedrooms, Shouldn't the Courts
Go in After Them?: An Update on the Fight Against "Sodomy" Laws, 21 FoRDHAM Un. L.J.
997, 1015, 1038 n.50, 1049 n.100, 1055 (1994).
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tional challenges to limitations on same-sex marriages.96 Judge
Mack's opinion has also been relied on by several writers who advocate enhanced legal protection against employers who discriminate
against gays and lesbians. 97
Moving beyond the specific issue of sexual orientation, several
scholars examine a perceived conflict between freedom of religion and

antidiscrimination principles, citing the Georgetown decision as a
prime illustration. 98 Recently, numerous articles have addressed this

conflict in the specific context of religious landlords who refuse to let
to unmarried couples; the Georgetown decision is considered instructive for its methodology in determining the existence of a compelling
governmental interest in eradicating previously unregulated forms of
discrimination. 9 9
96. See William N. Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage,79 VA. L. REv. 1419, 1425
n.14, 1509 n.314 (1993) [hereinafter Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage];Mark Strasser,
Domestic Relations Jurisprudenceand the Great, Slumbering Baehr: On DefinitionalPreclusion,
Equal Protection,and FundamentalInterests, 64 FORDHAM L. Rav. 921, 979 n.452 (1995).
97. Robert D. Stone, The American Military:We're Looking for a Few Good [Straight]Men,
29 GONZ. L. REv. 133, 157 n.213, 163 (1993-94); David E. Morrison, Note, You've Built the
Bridge, Why Don't You Cross It? A Call for State Labor Laws ProhibitingPrivate Employment
Discriminationon the Basis of Sexual Orientation,26 U. MiCH. J.L. REF. 245,250 n.26, 258 n.73,
276 (1992); Marie Elena Peluso, Note, Tempering Title VI's StraightArrow Approach:Recognizing and Protecting Gay Victims of Employment Discrimination,46 VArN. L. RFv. 1533, 1557
n.200, 1563 (1993); Susan Perissinotto Woodhouse, Comment, Same-GenderSexual Harassment:
Is It Sex Discrimination Under Title VII?, 36 SANTA C.ARA L. REv. 1147, 1180 n.272, 1186
(1996). The Georgetown case has also been invoked to illustrate the jurisprudential issues posed
by antidiscrimination statutes generally. Ellen J. Messing, Civil Rights Claims Under State Law:
Recent Developments, ALI-ABA Course of Study No. 696, at 127,150 (1991); Frank S. Ravitch,
Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: The Availability and Structure of a Cause of Action for
Workplace Harassment Under the Americans With DisabilitiesAct, 15 CARDozo L. RFv. 1475,
1498 n.113 (1994); Clark Freshman, Note, Beyond Atomized Discrimination:Use of Acts of DiscriminationAgainst "Other" Minorities to Prove DiscriminatoryMotivation Under Federal Employment Law, 43 STAN. L. REV. 241, 259 n.79 (1990).
98. See G. Sydney Buchanan, The Power of Government to Regulate Class Discrimination
by Religious Entities: A Study in ConflictingValues, 43 EMORY L.'. 1189,1200 n.63 (1994); Gayle
A. Grissum, Church Employment and the FirstAmendment: The Protected Employer and the
Vulnerable Employee, 51 Mo. L. REv. 911, 923 n.91, 931 (1986); Melissa Fishman Cordish, Comment, A Proposalfor the Reconciliationof Free Exercise Rights and Antidiscrimination Law, 43
UCLA L. REv. 2113,2127 n.88, 2135 nn.154-58, 2136 nn.159-64 (1996); Shelley K. Wessels, Note,
The Collision of Religious Exercise and Governmental NondiscriminationPolicies, 41 STAN. L.
Rv. 1201, 1206 n.17, 1217 n. 89-94, 1227-31, 1221 n.104 (1989).
99. Maureen E. Markey, The Priceof Landlord's "Free"Exercise of Religion: Tenant's Right
to Discrimination-FreeHousing and Privacy, 22 FoaRDHM UB. L.J. 699, 790, 801 nA89, 805
nn.507-08 (1995); Scott A. Johnson, Note, The Conflict Between Religious Exercise and Efforts to
EradicateHousing DiscriminationAgainst NontraditionalCouples: Should Free Exercise Protect
Landlord Bias?, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 351, 387-94 (1996); Robert C. Mueller, Comment,
Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Commission: A Free Exercise Defense to Marital
Status Discrimination?,74 B.U. L. REv. 145, 167 (1994); Rebecca A. Wistuer, Note, Cohabitation, Fornicationand the Free Exercise of Religion: LandlordsSeeking Religious Exemption from
Fair Housing Laws, 46 CASE W. Rvs. L. REv. 1071, 1097-1100, 1102 n.184 (1996).
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More broadly, numerous scholars have portrayed Judge Mack's

Georgetown opinion as important to understanding modem conflicts
between church and state. The most thorough analysis from this per-

spective has perhaps been that of Professor Mark Tushnet, who describes the case as "A Modem Paradigm" and draws from it empirical
support for his conclusion that judicially-crafted free exercise exemptions from general laws are neither necessary nor even useful. 100 Professor Tushnet is joined in this interpretation of the Georgetown
decision by other experts on law and religion.' However, Professor
Tushnet's appraisal of the conflict has been sharply rejected by other
leading commentators on church and state, such as Professor Michael

McConnell, who refers to "the deep intrusion on religious liberty
presented by the Georgetown case."'"

Thus the implications of the

decision for such matters as church autonomy and charitable tax exemptions have been explored. 0 3

Professor Tushnet is among many writers who have closely studied Judge Mack's Georgetown decision for its implications concerning

educational institutions. One such piece, by Professor Fernand Dutile, is one of the most thorough descriptive analyses of the deci-

100. 'fishnet. supra note 75.
101. See Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of
Church and State?, 49 LA. L. REv. 1057, 1062 & n.21, 1063 n.26, nA6 (1989); Ira C. Lupu, Of
Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; 56 MONT. L.
REv. 171, 208 n.141 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. Cm.
L. REv. 195, 221 n.123 (1992).
102. Michael W. McConnell, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Where is the
Supreme CourtHeading?,32 CATH. LAW. 187,201 & n.43 (1989). See also Douglas Laycock, The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 BYU L. REv. 221, 226 n.15 228-29 (1993); Michael W.
McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. Cm. L. REv. 115, 138 n. 111 (1992); Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpretingthe Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 Tax. L.
REv. 209, 216 & nA0 (1994).
103. See Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and Bills Number 82-86 of the Revision of
the Laws of Virginia, 1776-1786: New Light on the Jeffersonian Model of Church-StateRelations,
69 N.C. L. REv. 159, 211 (1990); J.Woodford Howard, The Robe and the Cloth: The Supreme
Court and Religion in the United States, 7 J.L. & POL. 481, 515 n.219, 523 (1991); Neil McCabe,
The State and FederalReligion Clauses: Differences of Degree and Kind, 5 ST. THoMAs L. REv.
49, 77 & n.183 (1992); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 747, 800 n.224, 816 n.302 (1993); George Tobin, Comment, Day Care and the
Establishment Clause: The Constitutionalityof the Certificate Programin §5,the "ABC" Bill, 12
GEO. MASON L. REv. 317, 326 n.69, 339 (1990); Michael G. Weisberg, Note, Balancing Cultural
Integrity Against IndividualLiberty: Civil Court Review of EcclesiasticalJudgments, 25 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 955, 961 n.21 (1992). On tax exemptions, see BRUCE R. HopINs, THE LAW OF TAXEXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 5.5 n.165 (5th ed. 1992); Oliver S.Thomas, The Power to Destroy:
The Eroding ConstitutionalArguments for Church Tax Exemption and the PracticalEffect on
Churches, 22 CUMB. L. Rmv. 605, 614 n.57, 635 (1991-92).
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sion. 1°4

Professor Dutile begins by quoting Professor Thomas
Schaffer's observation that the truly difficult cases pit not a good
against an evil, but rather a good against a good. 10 5 "It is the latter
situation which confronted the D.C. Court of Appeals," remarks Pro-

fessor Dutile. 1°6 Professor Dutile has written several additional pieces
putting the Georgetown decision and its aftermath into educational
perspective. 10 7 So too has Dr. Ralph Mawdsley.10 8 Many other writers share this interest in the Georgetown decision's educational
10 9
impact.

Two writers have looked to the Georgetown conflict in arguing
that free speech guarantees are the most promising way for gays and
lesbians to gain equal rights."10 But one area in which the import of
104. Fernand N. Dutile, God and Gays at Georgetown: Observationson Gay Rights Coalition
of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 15 J.C. & U.L. 1 (1988).
105. Id. at 2 (citing THOMAS SCHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRIMSIAN AND A LAWYER 174 (1981)).
106. Id.
107. In his annual survey of education law, Professor Dutile has also written several later
updates on the Georgetown case, and particularly on Congressional efforts to overturn the result
through the Armstrong Amendment. See Fernand N. Dutile, The Law of Higher Education and
the Courts: 1987, 15 J.C. & U.L. 87, 93-94, 137-38, 147 (1988); Fernand N. Dutile, Higher Education andthe Courts: 1988 in Review, 16 J.C.& U.L. 201,279-80 (1989); Fernand N. Dutile, Higher
Education and the Courts: 1989 in Review, 17 J.C. & U.L. 149, 164-65 (1990). A similar survey
update is contained in Lelia B. Helms & Larry D. Bartlett, Recent Developments in Public Education, 22 URB.LAW. 833, 874 (1990).
108. See Ralph D. Mawdsley, Employment Issues in Privateand Public Schools, 51 EDUC L.
REP. 1107, 1112-13 (1989); Ralph D. Mawdsley, EHA and ParochialSchools: Legal and Policy
Considerations,51 EDU. L. REP. 353, 364 n.80 (1989); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Has Wisconsin v.
Yoder Been Reversed? Analysis of Employment Division v. Smith, 63 EDUC. L. REP. 11 & n.2
(1990); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Comparison of Employment Issues in Public and Private Higher
Education Institutions,65 EDUC.L. REP. 669 & n.2, 673 n.20, n.23, 674 n.28, 676 (1991); Ralph D.
Mawdsley, Employment Division v. Smith Revisited: The Constriction of Free Exercise Rights
Under the United States Constitution, 76 EDuc. L. E'. 1, 14 n.103 (1992); Ralph D. Mawdsley,
'. 1, 10 n.63 (1993); Ralph D.
Emerging Legal Issues in Nonpublic Education, 83 EDUC. L.
Mawdsley, Religious EducationalInstitutions: Limitations and Liabilities Under ADEA and Title
VII, 89 EDuc. L. REP. 19, 33 n.91 (1994); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Limiting the Right of Religious
EducationalInstitutions to Discriminateon the Basis of Religion, 94 EDUC. L. REP. 1123, 1125
n.12, 1137 & n.87 (1994).
109. See Robert A. Destro, ABA and AALS Accreditation:What's "Religious Diversity" Got
To Do With It?, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 427,474 n.185, 475 n.196 (1995); Mark V. TIshnet, Public and
PrivateEducation:Is There a ConstitutionalDifference?, 1991 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 43, 44 n.4, 45, 58
n.80 (1991); William J.Wagner & Denise M. Ryan, The Catholic Sponsorship of Legal Education: A Bibliography,78 MARQ. L. REv. 507,545-46 (1995); Marjorie Reiley Maguire, Comment,
Having One's Cake and Eating It Too: Government Funding and Religious Exemptions for Religiously Affiliated Colleges and Universities, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 1061, 1064-66, 1067 n.25, 1089
n.141,1106 n.222,1112,1122 & nn. 320-24,1123 & nn. 325-31,1124 & nn.332-335 (1989); Edward
C. Lyons, Note, Oregon v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Educational
Perspective, 20 J.C. & U.L. 333, 342 (1994).
110. Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REv. 1695, 1714-15 (1993);
Larry W. Yackle, Parading Ourselves: Freedom of Speech at the Feast of St. Patrick,73 B.U. L.
REv. 791, 852 n.312 (1993).
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the Georgetown decision remains relatively unexplored is its implications for institutional expression protected by the First Amendment's
free speech guarantee. Significantly, Judge Mack's opinion relied as
much on free speech principles as on religious freedom in protecting
Georgetown University from a compelled utterance antithetical to its
institutional beliefs. Few writers have addressed the far-reaching implications of this reasoning as a justification for enforcing strong antidiscrimination policies on the campuses of private universities."'
Addressing the converse of this point, a few articles suggest an
emerging awareness of the institutional complexities involved when a
state regulates a private university's internal educational control over
its student groups."' But what has escaped notice is that institutional
autonomy to define a chosen educational mission is unquestionably
the strongest ground on which private universities can freely enforce
hate speech codes protecting gay and lesbian students. At public universities such codes have quickly run into First Amendment difficulties because, unlike private institutions, state actors may not favor one
ideological message over another. Commentators have focused exclusively on Judge Mack's compelling interest analysis as a tool against
homophobia. Yet her simultaneous concern for protecting Georgetown University's autonomy to express its own institutional values invites private universities to adopt internal hate speech codes
demanding full respect for gay men and lesbians-hate speech codes
that might intrude upon the free speech rights of campus homophobes
3
at public institutions.1

111. See, e.g., Leora Harpaz, JusticeJackson's FlagSalute Legacy: The Supreme Court Struggles to Protect Intellectual Individualism, 64 TEx. L. REv. 817, 885 n.254 (1986); John Michael
Vazquez, Note, New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 6
SErON HALL CONST. L.J. 389, 414 n.92 (1995).
112. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Student Religious Organizationsand University PoliciesAgainst
Discriminationon the Basis of Sexual Orientation:Implicationsof the Religious FreedomRestoration Act, 21 J.C. & U.L. 369, 399 (1994); Wendy Hernandez, Note, The Constitutionalityof Racially Restrictive Organizations Within the University Setting, 21 J.C. & U.L. 429, 453 (1994);
Jennifer L. Spaziano, It's All Fun and Games Until Someone Loses an Eye: An Analysis of University Liability for Actions of Student Organizations,22 PEPP. L. Rnv. 213, 239 n.175 (1994).
113. Jack M. Battaglia, Regulation of Hate Speech by EducationalInstitutions: A Proposed
Policy, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 345, 370-72 nn.143-50 (1991); Charles Wilson, Ex Corde Ecclesiae: The New Apostolic Constitutionfor Catholic Universities, 34 CATH. LAW. 17 (1991) (by the
advocate who argued the Georgetown University's case); Christopher J. Palermo, Note, Only the
News That's Fit to Print: Student Expressive Rights in Public School Communications Media AfterHazlewood v. Kuhlmeier,11 HAsriNos Comm.& ENT. L.J.35,62-63 (1988); Evan G.S. Siegel,
Comment, Closing the Campus Gates to Free Expression: The Regulation of Offensive Speech at
Colleges and Universities, 39 EMORY L.J. 1351, 1388 n.183 (1990).
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Several writers have been drawn to Judge Mack's Georgetown
opinion because of its political aftermath, which included the passage

of two acts of Congress seeking to overturn the decision"1 and a protracted new litigation testing the constitutionality of these so-called
Armstrong Amendments." 5 Some authors have studied the subsequent battle over the Georgetown decision in an effort to discover a

jurisprudence that might support home rule or even statehood for the
disenfranchised District of Columbia." 6 Others have discussed a
novel theory which emerged from the ensuing conflict, that legislative
voting by local officials is constitutionally protected by the Free
Speech Clause." 7 Another doctrinal product of the ensuing litigation
defines unconstitutional conditions imposed by Congress in an effort
to attain a constitutional end." 8 Yet another scholarly topic generated in the Byzantine aftermath of the Georgetown litigation concerned the effect of Congressional interference with federal judicial
decrees. 1 9
114. Armstrong Amendment I (D.C. Appropriations Act for 1989): Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Amendment No. 2541, 134 CONG. REc. S9106 ff.
(daily ed. July 8, 1988) (Armstrong Amendment I-Senate version); Nation's Capital Religious
Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Amendment No. 2541, 134 CONG. Rlc. S9131 ff. (daily ed.
July 11, 1988) (Armstrong Amendment I-Senate version); Nation's Capital Religious Liberty
and Academic Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 100-462, § 145, 102 Stat. 2269 (1988) (D.C. Appropriations Act for 1989; Armstrong Amendment I-final version).
Armstrong Amendment II (D.C. Appropriations Act for 1990): Nation's Capital Religious
Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, 135 CONG. REc. S11104 ff. (daily ed. Sept. 14,1989) (Armstrong Amendment 11-Senate Version); Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, 135 CONG. REc. H6550 ff. (daily ed. Oct. 3,1989) (Armstrong Amendment II-House
Version); Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, 135 CoNG. REc.
H6942 ff. (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1989) (Armstrong Amendment II-House/Senate Conference version); Nation's Capital Religious Liberty and Academic Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 101-168,
§ 141b, 103 Stat. 1248, 1267 (1989) (D.C. Appropriations Act for 1990; Armstrong Amendment
II-final version), codified at D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520(3) (1990).
115. Clarke v. United States, 705 F. Supp. 605 (D.D.C. 1988), affd, 886 F.2d 404 (1989),
vacated en banc 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
116. Jamin B. Raskin, Domination, Democracy, and the District The Statehood Position, 39
CAm. U. L. REv. 417 (1990); Philip G. Schrag, The Future of Districtof Columbia Home Rule,
39 CATH. U. L. REv. 311 (1990); Louis Michael Seidman, The Preconditionsfor Home Rule, 39
CATH. U. L. REv. 373 (1990).
117. Margaret G. Stewart, PoliticalFederalism and CongressionalTruth-Telling,42 CATS. U.
L. REv. 511, 555 (1993); Karla Grossenbacher, Note, Implementing StructuralInjunctions: Getting a Remedy When Local Officials Resist, 80 GEORGETOWN L.J 2227, 2236-38 (1992); Sherr,
supra note 81.
118. Christopher J. Kalil, SUNY Buffalo & Military Recruiters: Funding Unconstitutional
Conditions?, 39 BuFF. L. REV. 891, 911 n.124 (1991); J. Gregory Sidak, The President'sPower of
the Purse, 1989 DuTrr L.J. 1162, 1223 n.274 (1989).
119. CHARLES ALAN WRmGrr ET AL, FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE, §3533.10, at 426
(Supp. 1996); Kipp D. Snider, The Vacatur Remedy for Cases Becoming Moot on Appeal: In
Search of a Workable Solution for the Federal Courts, 60 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1642 (1992).
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The most sustained and thoughtful writing about the Georgetown
decision has come from the pen of Professor William Eskridge, joined
by his colleague Professor Gary Peller, both of Georgetown University law school. Professor Eskridge's ideas on the Georgetown conflict
have emerged in a trio of essays over the past few years. 120 His most
recent work is A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out": Religion, Homosexuality, and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public
Law.12 1 Three years earlier, Professor Eskridge included a chapter in
his book Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,in which he identified various "Normativist Jurisprudential Theories" of interpretation as exemplified by Judge Mack's Georgetown decision. 122 In 1991, Professor
Eskridge and Professor Peller published a substantial article which
discussed the Georgetown decision as a portent of postmodern jurisprudence."z It is fair to say that Professor Eskridge's work has introduced new and broader audiences to the Georgetown decision,
reaching beyond those readers already interested in the developing
jurisprudence of gay rights and of religious freedom.'2 4 What is especially striking about Professor Eskridge's writings is his effort to place
the Georgetown decision in a much broader context of jurisprudential
history and philosophy. He locates Judge Mack's opinion at the cusp
of postmodern legal theory, moving the judiciary to the forefront of
gay rights jurisprudence, feminist jurisprudence, and practical
hermeneutics.
In A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out", Professor Eskridge describes the Georgetown case as "emblematic" of a growing class of
cases involving "the collision of constitutional commitments between
the liberty of one group to exclude and express its disapproval, and
the desire of an excluded group for equal treatment."'" Every reli120. William N. Eskridge has also included shorter discussions of the Georgetown decision in
two other writings. See Eskridge, A History of Same-Sex Marriage, supra note 96; Eskridge,
Challenging the Apartheid of the Closet, supra note 82.
121. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57.
122. ESKRiDGE, DY Amic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72.
123. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movemen4 supra note 72.
124. For reviews of Professor Eskridge's work, see John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich,
Dynamic Statutory Interpreter,143 U. PA. L. Rav. 2209,2231-34 (1995) (review essay); Daniel A.
Farber, Statutory Interpretationand the Idea of Progress, 94 MsCHs. L. Ray. 1546, 1558-61, 1567
n.111 (1996) (book review); Brian C. Murchison, Interpretationand Independence: How Judges
Use the Avoidance Canon in Separation of Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. Rav. 85, 111 n.157 (1995);
William D. Popkin, An "Internal"Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation,
76 MuqN. L. Rv. 1133, 1171 (1992); William D. Popkin, Book Review, 45 J.LEGAL EDUC. 297,
301 (1995), M.B.W. Sinclair, Legislative Intent Fact or Fabrication?,41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv.
1329, 1334, 1380 & n.227 (1997) (a review essay).
125. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2415.
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gious community-or "nomos"-has been viewed as "jurisgenerative," or law-creating, because it is bound together by a common
126
normative heritage and a shared vision of what is ethically good.
Professor Eskridge points out that the gay community has similar
characteristics and that anti-homosexual prejudice bears a systematic
resemblance to antireligious prejudice. Borrowing from the late Professor Cover, Professor Eskridge points out that Judge Mack's Georgetown opinion reveals the existence of two nomoi-the Roman
Catholic community and the gay and lesbian community. 127 In the
case of each nomos, common experience has produced a "framework
of thinking about a wide range of issues; formal organizations for...
expressing group identity, and developing group positions; and a collective commitment to implementing shared values in people's
lives."' 28 Professor Eskridge describes Judge Mack's Georgetown
opinion as "jurisgenerative in a way that respected the Roman Catholic nomos without acquiescing in its wrongness on issues of sexual
orientation."' 29
In a perception of startling originality, Professor Eskridge argues
that Judge Mack's resolution of the Georgetown controversy "reflects
a distinctively but not uniquely 'gaylegal' jurisprudence ... [which]

derives from the gay experience of 'coming out of the closet."" 3 Professor Eskridge argues that the "phenomenology of coming out has
distinct metaphorical possibilities for thinking about issues of law.
Specifically, there is a jurisprudence suggested by the coming-out experience that can generate ideas relevant to the collision of liberty and
equality norms in cases like Gay Rights Coalition."'' This gaylegal
perspective supports Judge Mack's accommodation of each side's
identity speech and her encouragement of "nomic dialogue," an approach which recognized the respective importance of their conflicting
identities to both sides in the controversy.' 32 Judge Mack's opinion
departed from the traditional deployment of the law as an instrument
of mainstream suppression against deviant religious and minority eth126. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court1982 Term-Foreworti"Nomos andNarrative,
97 HARv. L. REv. 4, 4-11 (1983), reprinted in NARRATrVE,VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER 95-172 (Martha Minow et al.eds., 1992).
127. Eskridge, A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2413-14, 2433-34; EsKRmrE,DYNAic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 184-85.
128. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 184-85.

129.
130.
131.
132.
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Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof 'Coming Out, supra note 57, at 2415-16.
Id. at 2416.
Id. at 2441-42.
Id. at 2411-16.
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nic groups. In Cover's words, her opinion was not typically "jurispathic"-or law-killing-because it did not seek to destroy either
nomos. Instead, the jurisprudence of Julia Cooper Mack preserved
and protected the autonomy of religious and ethnic subcultures, as
well as the ability of their members to self-identify without penalty.
The Georgetown case thus stands as a significant contribution "to the
public law project of understanding and constructively resolving [such
'
increasingly prevalent] identity clashes."133
Balanced against Georgetown's First Amendment concerns was
the compelling social interest in protecting lesbian and gay students
from tangible discrimination. In her treatment of colliding constitutional norms-on one side freedom of speech and religion, on the other
equality and nondiscrimination Judge Mack's Georgetown opinion
was especially distinctive for its recognition of long-submerged voices.
In a real sense, the collective effort by gay students on campus to gain
official recognition for their organizations was an institutional act of
coming out. Professors Eskridge and Peller note that the Georgetown
decision is unusual not merely for its emphasis on dialogue and reconciliation, but also because it takes seriously the responsibility of the
judge to be open to perspectives of ...those who have been excluded

from citizenship. "In a remarkable survey of the medical and sociological literature, Mack debunked anti-homosexual prejudices as unfounded and built a powerful normative case for protecting the rights
of gays and lesbians."' 34 Judge Mack expanded the record to consider
information about the benign nature of sexual variation, the needless
persecution of gay men and lesbians, and the ways in which such persecution demeans the whole political community.' 35 She explicitly argued that "[t]he equal protection clause potentially shields gay,
lesbian, and bisexual communities from arbitrary state intrusion as
'discrete and insular minorities."" 3 6 In contrast to most of her col-

leagues, Judge Mack "makes an eloquent case for treating gay men
and lesbians with equal respect, and for criticizing discrimination
133. Id.

134. ESKRIDGE, DYNAIic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 178. See also
Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2433.
135. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2437; ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supranote 72, at 186; Eskridge & Peller, The New Public
Law Movement, supra note 72, at 757.
136.

ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATIoN,

supra note72, at 185. See also Es-

kridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2434, 2460; Eskridge & Peller, The
New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 754.
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against them."' 37 Professors Eskridge and Peller suggest that "Judge
Mack's extensive analysis of homosexuality in a heterosexual
world is
1' 38
an effort to liberate us from a false consciousness.'
Ironically, the novel arguments that forbid identity discrimination
against a gay student group also support respecting the cultural autonomy of a private religious university. "Forcing Georgetown to recognize the gay student groups could create the same sort of
masquerade-a phony identity-that compulsory heterosexuality
forces upon lesbian, gay, and bisexual people.' 1 39 From personal accounts of the coming out experience, Professor Eskridge draws lessons about the appropriate role of the state in mediating between the
communal commitments of minority subcultures. Inspired by these
lessons, gaylegal jurisprudence "provides ideas that help reconcile the
colliding commitments of our polity to both equality and liberty, to
nondiscrimination, free exercise, and free speech."' 40
The stories recounted by Professor Eskridge show that over the
past couple of generations the personally courageous act of coming
out to friends and family has been a defining moment of self-realization for many. Because the gay person wants an ongoing relationship,
coming out is an invitation to equal treatment from those closest in
one's life. "This is an invitation sometimes declined and sometimes
accepted unconditionally. Most often, however, the invitation is accepted with conditions"' 41 that facilitate further change over time and
allow continued discussions which promote reciprocal understanding.
"To preserve the relationship in the face of knowledge that creates a
normative rupture, each side has to make accommodation, respectful
of the other's different views about sexuality."' 42
So, too, in the Georgetown case, writes Professor Eskridge, the
university and its gay student groups were going to have an ongoing
relationship, just like that of friends and family. 1 43 There was room
for mutual respect because the students had voluntarily chosen to attend a private Roman Catholic institution and the University had encouraged their presence. The university's greatest need was for an
official distance from its gay student organizations, so that neither out137. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 758.
138. Id.
139. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2447-48.
140. Id. at 2438.

141. Id. at 2450.
142. Id. at 2452.
143. Id.
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siders nor the Vatican would think that the administration was approving all of their advocacy. 1 " The greatest need of the student
groups was equal access to the services and benefits that would give
them a stable existence within the university. "Mack's opinion treated
each party with respect and gave each what it most needed. The students got access to facilities and services on an equal basis with other
student groups, and the university was relieved of the formal association it feared would be inferred from official recognition of the gay
student groups." 4 5
Moreover, continues Professor Eskridge, Judge Mack's Georgetown opinion "created a structure friendly to dialogue between
the parties over time."1 46 While "[t]here was no assurance this would
occur ... Judge Mack's opinion gave it a chance."' 47 Professor Eskridge joined the Georgetown Law Center's faculty soon after the
Court of Appeals' decision and became the sponsor of the Law
Center's bisexual, gay and lesbian student group. "I found the Law
Center completely supportive of student efforts to create a healthy
gay-lesbian community and to provide informative programs for al
students and faculty," he writes. 48
The Law Center's Catholic chaplain, has been a counselor for students of all orientations and has materially supported the gay scholarship as well as the gay community at the Law Center. The main
campus was also supportive, and the priests who run the school
have been kind and respectful of gay identity and issues. The apparatus Mack set in motion has impelled the students and the priests
into a productive dialogue, where agreement and mutual respect
have dominated disagreement.1 49
Interestingly, Professor Eskridge's first-hand observation of this
dynamic institutional dialogue during the decade following the Georgetown decision seems to have overcome some initial reservations
about the result. At first, Professor Eskridge withheld final judgment
on the rightness of Judge Mack's unanticipated resolution of the Georgetown gay rights conflict. Writing with Professor Peller in 1991, he
described the decision as a compromise that may have initially disap144. Id.
145. Id. See also ESKRIDGE, DYNAInc STATUTORY INTrPRETATION, supra note 72, at 187,
188-89; Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movemen, supra note 72, at 758.
146. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out" supra note 57, at 2452.
147. Id. at 2452 n.158.
148. Eskridge, The Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supranote 57, at 2452 n.158. See also id.
at 2437 & n.109.
149. Eskridge, A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2452 n.158.
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pointed both parties but suggesting that in the longer term it might yet
"ameliorate" their normative differences in ways that a more lopsided
judicial decree never could. 5° By 1994, Professor Eskridge was already offering a more confident appraisal of the success of this reconciliatory experiment: "I think Mack's opinion has been
'jurisgenerative' (law-creating). Openly bisexual, gay, and lesbian students have a forum for mutual support and expression, while Georgetown has become a better educational institution without
sacrificing its Roman Catholic identity."' 1
Significantly, Professor Eskridge notes that Georgetown University lent no support to an aggressive Congressional effort to overturn
the Georgetown decision. In its measure known as the Armstrong
Amendment, Congress blocked the District of Columbia's entire $3.2
billion budget unless it amended its Human Rights Act to allow discrimination by religious schools against gay rights groups. 52 When
the District of Columbia's local legislature successfully challenged this
threat because the amendment would have compelled it to speak
against their collective conscience, Congress imposed the Armstrong
Amendment directly. But Georgetown University neither supported
this effort at governmental interference nor sought to take advantage
15 3
of it. "Judge Mack's principled accommodation held firm."'
While the charge can be made that such accommodationist strategies preserve remnants of the closet this is equally true whenever a
gay person agrees to go slowly with his parents.'54 Rather than viewing this as a concession to prejudice, Professor Eskridge regards it as a
gesture of respect and an open door to further progress. Both gay and
lesbian experience reveal that "coming out of the closet is not an allor-nothing matter. It is instead a process of mutually respectful education, dialogue, and accommodating the greatest needs of one another.' 55 Ultimately, if this proves impossible, members of a family
can always separate from each other. Because they have this basic
choice, the resolution of irreconcilable normative differences among
150. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 760-61.
151. ESKRGDGE, DYNAinc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supranote 72, at 189. See also Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movemen4 supra note 72, at 760-61.
152. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out" supra note 57, at 2452 n.158; EsmDGE,
DYNAMic STATUTORY IrTRPRETATON, supra note72, at 182 & nn.34 & 38.
153. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2452 n.158; EsKRMGE,
DYNAuc STATUTORY IrrERPRETATION, supra note72, at 182 & nn.34 & 38.
154. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2452.
155. Id. at 2452-53.
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private actors is simply not the function of the state. For the same
reason, public conflicts between competing private nomoi, exemplified at Georgetown University, must be sharply distinguished from
the absolute norm of equality that gay men and lesbians can properly
assert against all forms of government discrimination." 6
Hence, writes Professor Eskridge, "[t]he Georgetown case is the
quintessential hard case because identity speech values and constitutional norms were implicated for both contending parties or
nomoi."157 He applies the principle of mutual respect suggested by
the coming out experience and required by Judge Mack's Georgetown
opinion to other provocative cases involving collisions between liberty
and equality. These cases include an attempt by the State of Massachusetts to force parade organizers to allow the inclusion of an openly
gay marching group,' 58 an effort by the State of California to require a
religiously devout landlord to rent to unmarried couples,' 59 and an
attempt by the State of Indiana to impose tort liability on
pornographers whose work harms women. 6 °
As a gay man who has himself come out of the closet and as a
leading academic architect of the emergent gay rights jurisprudence,
Professor Eskridge views the Georgetown decision as a commitment
to public ideals shared by both the gay community and most religious
groups.
[G]ay radicals would be both naive and wrong if they believed that
gay equality trumps the rights of everybody else. It would be naive,
because we are the new 'rights group' on the block, and human beings and their institutions require time and struggle to internalize a
new group. It would be wrong, because the gay nomos should accept what the Roman Catholic church and most other religious
nomoi have accepted, the need to respect and accommodate other
people's and other groups' normative space.'61
In a country whose hallmark is a balance of independent cooperation
and autonomy, gay groups should join religious groups in working together to encourage full expression of divergent ethical commitments.
156. Id. at 2453.
157. Id. at 2449.
158. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 561
(1995).
159. Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 913 P.2d 909, 912-14 (Cal. 1996).
160. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1985), affd, 475 U.S.
1001 (1986).
161. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2473. See also EsKRMDGE,
DNANac STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 198.
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Professor Eskridge maintains that, in her concern for such nomic
diversity, Judge Mack's judicial writing reflects a jurisprudence that is
distinctively but not uniquely gaylegal. 162 For example, in his earlier
work, Professor Eskridge identifies other "normativist" theories of
statutory interpretation, all of which can be contrasted with conventional liberalism and its concern for process rather than outcomes. In
addition to gaylegal jurisprudence, these alternative approaches might
include natural law, postmodernist critiques, and feminist republicanism. All these value-oriented methods depart from the essential positivism of liberal and legal process theories of interpretation. Each of
these various styles of legal reasoning can be illustrated by reference
to the competing opinions of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the Georgetown decision. 63
Professor Eskridge discusses natural law theories of statutory interpretation by referring to the well-known work of Lon Fuller in the
1940s and 1950s, as developed more recently in the writings of Heidi
Hurd and Michael Moore.' 6 4 Such natural law thinkers deny the positivist claim that we can separate description and evaluation (or fact
and value). Nor should we want such separation: the link between law
and moral values is a good thing because norms would otherwise command no popular allegiance. In current legal thinking, for example,
Professors Hurd and Moore reject static interpretations of law-texts in
favor of dynamic ones that embrace some underlying moral reality.
"Hurd and Moore insist that statutory obligations are driven by pres' Consistent with their
ent needs and values, not those of the past."165
teachings, writes Professor Eskridge, "Judge Mack read the Human
Rights Act in light of larger principles-equal treatment of gay men
and lesbians and the university's right to the free exercise of
religion.'

1' 66

Yet Judge Mack's opinion also reveals the difficulty of following
an ideal commitment to interpreting the District of Columbia's
Human Rights Act in accordance with moral principles. "Two moral
values are in conflict, and two communities have radically different
ideas about the moral reality underlying the conflict."' 67
162. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2441-42.
163. ESKRIDGE, DYNmInc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 174-99; Eskridge
& Peler, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 708, 745-61, 782-87.
164. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMic STATuTORY INrERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 180.

165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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What is the morally right answer to Gay Rights Coalition? I do not
know. Confronting each other in the case were two immiscible
moral realities. This dissonance suggests that in some cases there is
no underlying moral reality or that moral values will usually be unknowable to us or heavily dependent on context. Moore and Hurd
surely have pitches they can make about the moral reality of Gay
Rights Coalition,but they would be hard-pressed to do a better job
than the seven judges of the District's Court of Appeals-seven
me with a sense that there
judges whose different perspectives leave
168
is no single right answer to this case.
An even more vivid illustration of this difficulty might be the sharply
opposed reactions to the Georgetown decision from Professor Eskridge, for whom transcendent natural law principles necessarily include full gay equality, and the well-known natural law theorist John
Finnis, for whom the state may publicly discourage homosexuality
provided that it respects the privacy of the bedroom. Indeed, as I
have noted, the radical conflicts among the seven separate opinions in
the Georgetown decision are oddly reminiscent of Fuller's hypothetical jurisprudential classic The Case of the Speluncean Explorers.1 69
Such divergent judicial and scholarly perspectives reveal the indeterminate quality of natural law reasoning and invite consideration of
Jacques Derrida's theory of postmodernist deconstructionism. Applying Derridian deconstructionist theory, Professor Eskridge deftly
shows how it is possible to "flip" each of the opinions, including Judge
Mack's, by challenging the primacy of the text that is invoked as authoritative and showing that it is capable of multiple plausible interpretations. 7 ° Hierarchies of interpretation can always be inverted,
both within and without the text. This deconstructionist methodology
can be extended infinitely, until any hope of 71discovering objective
meaning in formal rules is exposed as illusory.'
One postmodernist attempt to contain the radical implications of
statutory deconstructionism is advanced by Stanley Fish and Margaret
Jane Radin, who suggest that objective meaning resides loosely in conventional understandings outside the text, not in the text itself.1 72 But
as Professor Eskridge points out, conventions fall apart, and changing
interpretations follow: "law is not a continuous practice but is filled
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 181.
Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616 (1949).
STATUTORY INTEP PRETATION, supra note 72, at 194-96.
E, Dx'nic
ESKR
Id. at 193-96.
Id. at 192-97.

[VOL. 40:513

Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and Racial Equality

with ruptures as well as uncertainties."173 Professor Eskridge considers that an excellent example of rupture was the social treatment of
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals after 1969. He continues:
the legal interpretive community knew what to do with "homosexu-

als" in the 1950s and 1960s: identify them, exclude them, institutionalize them. This was law's practice until gay men and lesbians
fought back, starting with the Stonewall riots in June 1969. Because
the new gay liberation movement problematized previous medical
and moral stigmas against people who were intimate with others of
their gender, it unraveled many strands of the social web and disrupted practice. Georgetown's exclusion of gay and lesbian students was firmly grounded in pre-1969 practice, but by the 1980s
that practice was in a state of confusion. What made Gay Rights
Coalition a hard case was that one social construction ("homosexuals" as sick, immoral, or pathetic people) was giving way to another
one (lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals as a minority against whom
discrimination is unjustifiable).1 74
The Georgetown conflict "illustrates our normative heterogeneity."' 75
In addition to gaylegal jurisprudence, natural law, and
postmodernist deconstruction, Professor Eskridge finds another
normativist theory in feminist republicanism, which responds directly
to this challenge of conflicting values in a heterogenous society. 1 7 6 In
a committed effort to mediate between the moral idealism of natural
law and the radical skepticism of deconstructionist hermeneutic philosophy, feminist jurisprudence proposes a dialogic approach to statutory and constitutional interpretation. While the ultimate goal is still
right answers, feminist and republican theorists are less confident
about this possibility and believe in accommodating colliding norms.
They stress reconciliation and ongoing citizenship. 77
Cultural feminism rests on an ethic of care, as opposed to an ethic
of rights. As Professors Eskridge and Peller point out, "[f]eminist jurisprudence starts with the primacy of the community and of groups
within the larger community, and situates individuals not as autonomous, but rather as connected with one another and with a variety of
173. ESKRMDGE, DYNAMiC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 198.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 184. See also Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out" supranote 57, at 2433.
176. See ESKREDGE, DYNAMIuC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 183-92; Es-

kridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movemen supra note 72, at 756-61.
177. EsKREnDE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 183-92; Eskridge
& Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 756-61.
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communities."'1 78 "This approach considers statutory interpretation
an opportunity to understand and reconcile, rather than to deny or
suppress, norms in collision."' 7 9 According to Professors Eskridge
and Peller, this feminist and republican stance contrasts sharply with
traditional, male-oriented Anglo-American jurisprudence, which assumes "the primacy of atomistic individuals whose autonomy is protected by the enforcement of inviolable 'rights.""8 " Under Judge
Mack's cultural feminist approach, however, constitutional decision
making is not "rule-based, rights-based, or utilitarian balancing. It is
not abstract, neutral, or hierarchical-it is instead concrete and situated, engaged, and web-like."''
The theory of cultural feminism makes no claim "that all women
are attracted to an ethic of care, but its ideas are drawn from women's
experiences in our society."' 8 2 Professors Eskridge and Peller draw
from the work of feminist legal scholars to focus attention on Judge
Mack's ability to empathize with both sides in the Georgetown gay
rights case. They point out that Judge Mack was the only woman deciding this case on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals:
Feminist theory is familiar with the ways in which traditional jurisprudence marginalizes the interests of groups outside the traditional
elites, for that is how family law, the crime of rape, and employment
law have been constituted to the disadvantage of women. In part
because women have directly experienced social domination, feminist thought has been critical of traditional legal theory for its complacency and its failure to understand or recognize "the perspective
of the oppressed." As a corollary of their focus on women's
marginalization, feminist practice has explored modes of social
marginalization generally. Feminists tend to be particularly critical
of accepted dividing8 3practices. Their perspective is, again, reflected
in Mack's opinion.1
In contrast to her male colleagues, Judge Mack made out a concrete
case for "treating gay men and lesbians
with equal respect and criticiz18 4
1
them.'
against
discrimination
ing
178. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 756.
179. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 186.
180. Eskridge & Peler, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 756.
181. Id. at 756-57. See also ESKRmDGE, DYNAmic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note

72, at 186-87.
182. ESKRIDGE, DYNAmic STATUTORY

hITERPRETATION,

supra note 72, at 186.

183. ESKRmOE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 186-87. See also

Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movemen supra note 72, at 758.
184. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 758.

[VOL.

40:513

Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and Racial Equality
Hence, Professors Eskridge and Peller find it instructive to compare Judge Mack's opinion with those of her six male colleagues.
They find that the male judges on the court spoke in terms of individual rights and government authority. In particular, "[t]he four dissenting judges invoked the argot of rights and balancing and adopted rigid
denunciatory stances in their opinions. Mack, in contrast, focused on
community needs and group interests.' 1 5 According to Professors
Eskridge and Peller, among the most noteworthy aspects of Judge
Mack's opinion is its avoidance of traditional rights discourse and its
focus instead on communal concerns.
They are similarly struck by Judge Mack's refusal to be bound by
narrowly litigated issues. In an important insight, Professors Eskridge
and Peller focus on Judge Mack's unexpected doctrinal analysis:
An important theme of cultural feminism is that one does not have
to approach colliding norms from a win-lose perspective (the ethic
of rights); one can instead try to reformulate the apparent conflict,
approaching it from a different angle which seeks to reconcile various normative commitments (the ethic of care). This theme too is
prominent in Mack's opinion. The parties posed the issues in the
lawsuit in starkly dichotomous win-lose terms: either Georgetown
was required to recognize the gay and lesbian student groups, with
of posing the issue
all the attendant benefits, or it was not. This way
186
sharpened the normative conflict in the case.
Instead, Mack's two-pronged approach "enabled her to show both
sides that she had attended to their key interests and to offer a result
that accommodate the most significant needs of each group."'" 7
"What is most remarkable about Mack's opinion is its effort to
minimize the "jurispathic" (literally, law-killing) role to which most
statutory and constitutional interpreters are resigned.' 8 8 The parties
arrayed themselves in the traditional adversarial postures, in which
the lawsuit resembled a jousting match-a battle to the death between two normative visions (free exercise taking on antidiscrimina185. ESKRIDGE, DYNAic STATuTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 186. See also
Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 756-57.
186. ESKRDGE, DYNAvIuc STATuTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 187. See also Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2436-37, 2449-50, 2452; Eskridge &
Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 758, 760-61.
187. ESKRmIGE, DYNAMIc STATuToRY INTERPRETATION, supranote 72, at 187. See also id.
at 188-89; Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2436-37, 2449-50, 2452;
Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 758, 760-61.
188. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 187-89. See also
Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 759-61.
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tion).' 89 "The judges themselves seethed with legal bloodlust."'190 An
obvious criticism of the feminist republican approach comes from natural law theorists, among others, who refuse to substitute a goal of
reconciliation in place of some higher moral imperative. But such authoritarian or jurispathic judging is questionable under republican and
feminist theory, because it aggravates the tension between our constitutional ideals of self-government and government of laws. "By taking an imperial stance that exercises a nonmajoritarian dominion over
one of the two communities," write Professors Eskridge and Peller,
"the authoritarian judge is denying freedom to one of the communities to set its own norms, and thereby abridging that community's citizenship, its part in self-government." 191
This analysis shows that the jurisgenerative role reflected in
Judge Mack's Georgetown decision offers hopes for reconciliation and
opportunities for a "dissolution of difference" between clashing communities. On this view, "[o]nly by redefining the problem or offering
opportunities for the transformation of preferences, or both, can the
judge-and our polity-protect the self-government and citizenship of
the communities. This is true government of laws."'192 Such an approach has an ambitious aim. "Reconciliation can come through dialogue: the interpreter hearing each side sympathetically,
experimenting with new ways of posing the problem to protect the
interests of each in part, and presenting the communities with opportunities to speak to each other afresh, perhaps with the hope that preferences can change.' 93

Drawing on the feminist republican scholarship of Martha Minow, Suzanna Sherry, Frank Michelman, and Margaret Jane Radin,
Professor Eskridge identifies several characteristics of such a reconciliatory project: the need for dialogue, the centrality of history, mutual
acceptance of responsibility, and respect for identity.
Under this vision of statutory interpretation Mack's opinion is an
overture to the parties, and its most brilliant move is the creation of
a dialogue between the two communities: Georgetown has to let the
189. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMic STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 187.
190. ESKRIDGE, DYNA.Nc STATUTORY INTERPRFTATION, supra note 72, at 187. See also Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movemen4 supra note 72, at 759-61.
191. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 759-60. See also
ESKRmGE, DYNAMIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 188.
192. Eskridge & Peler, The New Public Law Movemen4 supra note 72, at 760. See also
EsKRIDGE, DYNAMIc STATUoRY INTERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 188-89.

193. ESKRmGE, DYNAMNc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, supranote 72, at 188. See also Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 760-61.
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gay and lesbian students become participants in the intellectual and
social community, but on face-saving terms for the university, while
the students have to respect Georgetown's perspective even as they
seek to persuade other students of its error.1 94

Judge Mack thus invited "the parties to join [together] in a modus
vivendi, a shared community that over time could ameliorate their
normative differences in ways that a judicial decree cannot."' 195
In sum, the work of Professors Eskridge and Peller claims that
Judge Julia Cooper Mack's lead opinion in Gay Rights Coalition of
Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University portends
a distinct genre of jurisprudence written in the spirit of a postmodern
age. In Judge Mack's opinion they discern "a commitment toward
legal decision making that emphasizes situatedness and context instead of universals and abstractions; reconciliation and accommodation instead of conflict and rights; and community instead of
autonomy.' 1 96 This commitment manifests itself in Judge Mack's
practical resolution of colliding norms; her focus on group needs and
interests rather than individual rights; her sensitivity to the voice 1of
97
the dispossessed; and her effort to reconcile rather than to separate.
"While Judge Mack's accommodationist approach is subject to the
charge that she was just splitting the difference for political rather
"the apthan principled reasons," concludes Professor Eskridge,
98
proach can pragmatically be defended as Solomonic."'
I.

HIDDEN HISTORY #1: A CRITICAL RACE ANALYSIS
OF THE GEORGETOWN DECISION

Despite the buckets of scholarly ink spilt on the Georgetown Decision over the past decade, perhaps its most intriguing single aspector determinant?-has completely escaped detection. The decision's
separate five-two majorities-holding for Georgetown on the issue of
official recognition and its accompanying religious endorsement and
for the gay student groups on the issue of equal access to all other
benefits-obscured what was more precisely a three-two-two
formation:
194. ESKRIGE, DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATrION, supra note 72, at 188-89. See also
Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2452; Eskridge & Peler, The New
Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 760-61.
195. Eskridge & PeUer, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 760-61.

196. Id. at 756. See also id. at 751-52.
197. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movemen supra note 72, at 756.
198. Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof 'Coming Out, supra note 57, at 2437.
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GAY RIGHTS COALITION GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
no compelled recognition
equal tangible benefits
5-2
5-2
(First Amendment principle)
(antidiscrimination principle)
\ /
Judge Mack
Chief Judge Pryor
Judge Newman
\
/
Judge Ferren
Judge Terry
(compelled recognition too)

Judge Belson
Judge Nebeker
(no tangible benefits either)

What neither Professor Eskridge nor any other commentator
ever noticed was that the Georgetown Decision broke cleanly along
the color line. This scholarly oversight is understandable as this significant detail is not apparent from a printed case report without independent knowledge of the court's racial composition. Judge Mack's
analysis was joined by Chief Judge Pryor and Judge Newman. These
three African-American judges put equal value on the competing social interests: they held for Georgetown University on the endorsement issue and for, the gay students on the issue of equal access to
tangible benefits.1 99
Although dividing evenly on its outcome, the four white judges
on the court rejected Judge Mack's unexpected bifurcation strategy
and followed the litigants' all-or-nothing approach. For two of those
four white judges, Georgetown's religious freedom completely
trumped the gay students' antidiscrimination claim: Judge Belson and
Judge Nebeker agreed with the three black judges that Georgetown
University need not endorse the gay student groups, but for them it
followed that the compelled provision of tangible benefits was equally
199. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1,
1-39 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (Mack, J.); &-at 39-40 (Pryor, CJ., concurring); id. at 40-46 (New-

man, J., concurring).
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unconstitutional. 2" On the opposite end of the spectrum, for the
other two white judges, the gay students' antidiscrimination claim
completely trumped Georgetown's religious freedom: Judge Ferren
and Judge Terry agreed with the three black judges that the gay student groups must be afforded equal tangible benefits but saw no reashould not also be forced to officially recognize
son why Georgetown
201
the groups.
Two of the nine judges had recused themselves because of their
work for the adversaries in this case. Judge Judith Rogers, an AfricanAmerican woman, served as Corporation Counsel, the District's highest law officer; and before his appointment Judge John Steadman, a
white man, was a Georgetown law professor. One can only speculate
as to how Judge Rogers and Judge Steadman might have affected this
racially distributed voting pattern.
Why did the seven sitting judges view the Georgetown conflict
differently depending on their race? Before we consider that question,
I wonder how many readers have already begun to revise their understanding of the competing arguments based on this tantalizing information. For example, what can one make of the following language
from the partially dissenting opinion of Judge Ferren, joined by Judge
Terry:
If Judge Mack and her colleagues are correct-if gay fights groups
must have access to tangible benefits equal to that of other groups
but may lawfully be excluded from the list of officially "recognized"
student groups having access to the same benefits-then the Act
permits a "separate but equal" access to university facilities and
services reminiscent of the justification that once permitted blacks
on public buses, but only in the back.202
In context, this seems a most peculiar argument. Given that "Judge
Mack and her colleagues" (Chief Judge Pryor and Judge Newman) are
themselves black, they presumably appreciated even better than their
that once
white brethren the pernicious nature of "the justification
23
permitted blacks on public buses, but only in the back.
At this point we are reminded that legal argumentation, which
after all is just analogy and rhetoric heaped one on top of the other, is
concurring
concurring and dissenting); id. at 75-78 (Nebeker, J.,
200. Id. at 62-74 (Belson, J.,
and dissenting).
201. Id. at 46-63 (Ferren, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 74-75 (Terry, J. concurring and
dissenting).

concurring and dissenting, joined by Terry, J.).
202. Id. at 49 (Ferren, J.,
203. Id.
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invariably surreal but for its political consequences. To follow Judge
Ferren's point, one must concede not only that the particular student
organizations termed "gay rights groups" are indistinguishable from
"blacks," but also that a private religious university's "official recognition" process for its student clubs is indistinguishable from "public
buses." In quoting this passage, Professors Eskridge and Peller are
apparently unaware that this verbal volley was launched by white
judges attacking the reasoning of black judges. They simply remark
that Judge Ferren "engages in an interesting battle of analogies with
Judge Mack,' 20 4 a reference to her deconstructionist flip of Georgetown University and its gay rights groups into a hypothetical Gay
University of America at loggerheads with its Catholic student group.
Professor Eskridge adds that "Ferren's charge reflects his assumption
that the concept of gay rights is essentially assimilationist, but that
charge rings false to "queer crits," for whom the university's disappro20 5
bation is more like a badge of honor than the back seat of the bus.
But Professor Eskridge himself falls victim to that assimilationist
premise, at least momentarily. Elsewhere in his discussion he asks
"[w]ould Mack have been willing to let Bob Jones University refuse to
recognize an African-American student group because it advocated
2 6
interracial dating, to which Bob Jones objects on moral grounds?
Professor Eskridge evidently finds an affirmative answer to his question inconceivable because without further discussion he immediately
continues "By treating gay and lesbian student groups so differently
from racial or other groups, Mack's opinion echoed the invidious differentiation and exclusion of gays and lesbians practiced by the Catholic church. It invited the charge that it was just a kinder, gentler
homophobia.

' '2 °7

204. Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 755 n.149.
205. Eskridge, DYNAmC STATUTORY INrERPRETATION, supra note 72, at 191-92.
206. Id. at 181.
207. Eskridge, DNAmic STATroRY I-nRP=RA fON, supra note 72, at 181. See also Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2434-35, 2436 n.105., 2448-49. Elsewhere, Professor Eskridge identifies another possible criticism of Judge Mack's Georgetown

opinion when he notes that "Judge Mack's opinion fails to subject Georgetown's values (the
Catholic Church's rejection of homosexuality) to the same critical scrutiny" that she employs in
recognizing a compelling constitutional interest in eradicating sexual orientation discrimination.
Eskridge & Peller, The New Public Law Movement, supra note 72, at 754. The short answer to
this concern is that courts are not in the business of doing theology. See, e.g., United States v.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944). Rather, Judge Mack fulfilled her civil responsibility of presenting a
reasoned and principled secular argument that supported complete equality for gay men and
lesbians, thereby confronting Georgetown University with a serious challenge to its theological
assumptions. This secular challenge did influence church thinking, but with an unexpected twist.
In deciding not to petition for certiorari to the federal Supreme Court, Georgetown commis-
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In contrast to Professor Eskridge, to me it seems an open question whether Judge Mack would refuse to protect Bob Jones University's antimiscegenation requirement for its student groups. What if
during the twenty-first century the board of Howard University were
to be controlled by black separatists who refuse to recognize a largely
white student group that advocates interracial dating? Would the District of Columbia Human Rights Act's ban on race discrimination apply? If it did, would Howard University have a First Amendment
freedom of association defense as a private institution? In the case of
Bob Jones University, would that First Amendment defense be even
stronger because it is based on sincere religious convictions? In such
situations, why should anyone outside those particular institutions give
a damn because Bob Jones University has a well-earned reputation
for bigotry or because Howard University might follow in the footsteps of Bob Jones University and thus risk forfeiting its equally wellearned reputation for advancing racial equality? Students and faculty
who do not share Bob Jones University's bigoted institutional philosophy already shun that school and would presumably shun Howard
University, too, were it to adopt comparable policies-thus reducing it
from its current elevated academic reputation as a major national research institution to the quite different role that Bob Jones University
occupies as a private enclave of petty hatreds (however religiously
motivated).
It might be answered that we should care because in Bob Jones
University v. United States, the Supreme Court has already found a
compelling governmental interest in eradicating racial discrimination
on private religious campuses. °8 This is a weak argument as it relies
not on substance, but rather on the infallible authority of the same
tribunal that decided Dred Scott,209 Plessy,2 10 and more recently Bowers.211 More to the point, it is inaccurate. In Bob Jones University, the
sioned a Catholic theologian's report, which concluded not only that Judge Mack's extension of

tangible benefits to the gay student groups was actually consistent with church teachings, but
indeed that such benevolence was even required by the Christian ethic of treating all persons

with equal dignity. This liberal interpretation of Catholic doctrine was not shared by the local
archbishop, James Hickey, nor for that matter by the Vatican. Soon after Georgetown University made its peace with the gay student groups, Pope John Paul I issued a papal encyclical that

requires Catholic universities to become more conservative on gay rights as well as other contested issues in church doctrine. Ex Corde Ecclesiae.

208. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
209. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).

210. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
211. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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Supreme Court never said that a private school could not engage in
racially discriminatory practices based on sincere religious convictions. Rather, it said that if University chose to discriminate based on
race, it must pay for its bigotry out of its own pocket, because the
public purse could not be used to support such race discrimination
through charitable tax exemptions.21 2 Judge Mack found Judge Ferren's incantation of Bob Jones University wanting for that very reason
because the Georgetown decision constitutionally tested a much
stronger public antidiscrimination tool: the complete statutory outlawry of religiously motivated private discrimination under all circumstances.3 And before one dismisses constitutional free exercise
claims as nothing more than a license to discriminate, one should recall the fate of poor Berea College, which raised an unsuccessful free
exercise defense early this century in a doomed conscientious effort to
avoid compliance with the state of Kentucky's morally reprehensible
Jim Crow laws. 14
Thus, Judge Mack refused to accept Judge Ferren's neat equation
between a public bus and a private religious university's grant of official recognition to its student clubs. But as her judicial clerk, I do
recall quite vividly the morning of March 10, 1987, when Judge Mack
handed me the obituary section of that day's Washington Post and
instructed me to work it into her draft lead opinion in the Georgetown
case. Judge Mack, quoted black gay activist, Melvin Boozer, who had
just died of AIDS at forty-one: "I know what it means to be called
and I can sum up
nigger, and I know what it means to be called faggot,
21 5
the difference between them in one word: none.
212. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-04 ("Denial of tax benefits will
inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not
prevent those schools from observing their religious tenets.").
213. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ., 496 A.2d at
582, 585-86 (D.C. 1985) (Mack, J., dissenting from panel majority), vacated and replaced by, 536
A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (en bane). Hence, because of this critical factual distinction, Professor Eskridge reads too much into that decision when he writes that "[t]he 1983 Supreme Court decision
in Bob Jones University v. United States supports Ferren's argument." Eskridge, The Jurisprudence of "Coming Out", supra note 72, at 2435. Professor Eskridge does acknowledge that Bob
Jones "has not been applied by the Court to restrict nomic community in other contexts and may
be a constitutional outlier." Id. at 2436 n.105.
214. Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). Berea College's struggle against the

State of Kentucky was just one religiously inspired act of civil disobedience that ultimately led to
racial equality, from the time of abolitionism to the recent civil rights era. Countless examples of
brave spiritual resistance against worldly oppressions can readily be drawn from other times and
places around the globe.
215. 536 A.2d at 38.
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So why did the seven sitting judges view the Georgetown conflict
differently depending on their race? Why did the three black judges
weigh equally the gay students' antidiscrimination claim and the university's freedom of speech and religion claim while the four white
judges insisted on a total victory for one side or the other? It is at
least conceivable that the very different personal experiences the
black judges brought to the bench engendered in them an innate suspicion of abusive authority, prompting them to condemn persecution
in all its varied forms.
Is race, therefore, intrinsic to judicial voice? In a racially polarized society, it surely must play some role. When the black judges
on the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were starting out on
their legal careers, American justice was very white indeed. We know
from this Howard Law Journal symposium that Constance Baker
Motley and Julia Cooper Mack were the first two black women ever
to argue before the United States Supreme Court (a few *weeks apart
in 1961); that Julia Cooper Mack later led the appellate division of the
EEOC soon after its creation and during that agency's early development of modern civil rights law; and that Judge Mack became the first
woman of color on any American court of last resort (and perhaps any
American appellate court) in 1975. In 1976, Judge Theodore Newman
became the first black chief judge in the United States. Chief Judge
William Pryor followed with his appointment in 1979.
It is certainly arguable that the Georgetown decision, sharply divided along the color line, offers powerful empirical evidence that diversification of the bench has the capacity to transform American
jurisprudence both in style and in substance. At a minimum, the Georgetown decision's complex voting pattern invites close scrutiny of
the way previously excluded judicial voices have begun to articulate a
new and distinctive jurisprudence. This symposium also shows that
Judge Mack's strong dissenting voice has made a deep impression on a
more systemic level. Today there is much debate about the likely consequence of diversifying our judiciary through the recruitment of women and jurists of color. Does representative judicial diversity
actually change interpretive outcomes? Or is it desirable only because
it enhances perceived fairness and thus legitimizes the exercise of
legal authority?
As we seek answers to these important questions, the work of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals may warrant particular empirical scrutiny, both collectively and on account of its individual mem-
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bers. For the past couple of decades, in terms of race and gender, that
tribunal has been by far the most diverse court of last resort nationwide-although still under representing the District of Columbia's
mostly black population. Its nine regular judges currently include
three women of color-Chief Judge Annice Wagner (appointed 1989),
Judge Vanessa Ruiz (appointed 1994), and Judge Inez Smith Reid (appointed 1995); its sitting senior judges include Judge Julia Cooper
Mack (appointed 1975), Judge Theodore Newman (appointed 1976),
and Judge William Pryor (appointed 1979). Its past members include
three more African-American jurists, Judge Austine Fickling (appointed 1968, now deceased), Judge Hubert Pair (appointed 1970,
now deceased), former Chief Judge Judith Rogers (appointed 1982,
now sitting on the federal circuit court), and also the court's only
white woman member, Judge Catherine Kelly (appointed 1967, now
deceased). Another tribunal which invites critical scrutiny is the Minnesota Supreme Court, the only American court of last resort to reflect demographic reality by boasting a majority of women justices.
As courts of last resort, both the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court are free to develop their
precedents in whatever direction they please. Unlike intermediate appellate courts, they are not answerable to any higher decision making
authority. For serious researchers who want to examine the real impact of judicial diversity upon the substance of American jurisprudence, the recent case law of these two high courts therefore provides
ideal twin laboratories for controlled empirical research. Similar comparative studies of the work of postcolonial foreign supreme courts,
newly staffed by jurists of indigenous backgrounds, could prove
equally fruitful.
IV. HIDDEN HISTORY #2: POLITICAL AND POPULAR
REACTIONS TO THE GEORGETOWN DECISION.
The scholarly commentary on the Georgetown gay rights controversy is summarized in the short bibliography essay above. What has
struck me most is the consistently ahistorical, reductionist tendency of
these scholarly accounts. In arguing for a typically partisan perspective, writers must conceal the kaleidoscopic, often paradoxical character of the conflict and of the human motivations that lay beneath it.
The work of Georgetown law professor William Eskridge is a rare
exception to this reductionism and are undoubtedly the most ambi[VOL.
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tious to date. Of necessity, however, even this highly sophisticated
jurisprudential analysis, which portrays the Georgetown Decision as a
paradigm of postmodern jurisprudential reasoning, is largely confined
to a textual analysis of the opinions without detailed reference to the
political turmoil that surrounded this case. Indeed, beyond fairly cursory and generally partisan historical summaries, no scholar has yet
sought to expose the complex and shifting events making up this epic
tale, the personal motivations and ideals that lay beneath them, or the
cultural and political context within which the conflict unfolded.
A rich challenge for the postmodern legal historian would therefore be a narrative history of the Georgetown controversy. Only upon
such a foundation can the full jurisprudential and political dimensions
of this case be fully appreciated. This task presents a daunting methodological challenge to any legal historian or legal philosopher concerned with the issues of objectivity in history and law. Clearly, in this
typically American clash of group cultures, what you saw in the Georgetown case depended upon where you stood. There was no one
truth in this conflict, but many truths which do not fit easily together.
Ultimately, the Georgetown struggle tested our simultaneous commitment to the political ideals of freedom, equality, and self-determination; Roman Catholics, gay activists, and African-American District
statehood advocates, all historically-excluded groups, fought for sometimes competing, often overlapping versions of the social good.
Those who closely followed this case during the 1980s will surely
recall its epic quality, both in human and in jurisprudential terms. The
unfolding of events were nothing short of remarkable. These included
the evolution of Georgetown over two centuries from an ethnic, religious enclave into an elite research institution; the halting acceptance
of immigrant Catholics into the mainstream of a pluralist American
society; the recent emergence of the gay community as a contender
for equal treatment, as symbolized in the District of Columbia's pioneering Human Rights Act; the formation of the gay student groups at
Georgetown University and the filing of their lawsuit; and the $200
million controversy in the District of Columbia Council, where Mayor
Marion Barry blocked Georgetown's tax-exempt bond approval because the school had successfully invoked its First Amendment
freedoms.
All this preceded Judge Mack's Georgetown decision, which was
handed down on November 20, 1987, after a long decade of bitterly
contested litigation. Consider the immediate reactions. "We consider
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it a complete victory," said Richard Gross, the gay students' appellate
lawyer, adding that the groups did not care if they had official university recognition so long as they had equal privileges.2 16 Gross called
the decision "enormously significant" because it held for the first time
that "gay rights have the same status as a compelling interest as race
and sex discrimination. 2 17 Nan Hunter, then director of the American Civil Liberties Union's lesbian and gay rights project, agreed. 1 8
She hailed the Georgetown Decision as "enormously important" and
predicted that it would have a tremendous impact in toughening state
human rights statutes and municipal ordinances nationwide. 21 9 "The
decision will definitely strengthen enforcement litigation wherever
there are local laws,"'22 said Hunter. "I can easily envisage briefs
quoting this language." 221 The Washington Post noted that the Georgetown decision was the first time a high court has ruled that banning discrimination against homosexuals had the same important
constitutional status as banning discrimination against blacks and
2 22

women.

The decision initially delighted top Georgetown officials. They
stressed that their primary concern was the university's right to adhere
to its religious principles by refusing to formally recognize groups that
oppose Roman Catholic beliefs. "Georgetown University is gratified
that today the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed what
the university always felt to be the principal issue in the case, its right
to adhere to its religious heritage," announced Georgetown's Jesuit
president, Father Timothy Healy.22 5 He was pleased that the court
upheld "the university's right to refuse to endorse moral positions not
in accord with its traditions.""2 4 Father Healy rejoiced that the case
was over. "We hope that following this ruling," he said, "the university community will be able to put this divisive issue behind us."' 25
216. University Gay Groups Win Equal Privileges,N.Y. TnAs, Nov. 22, 1987, at 32.
217. Solomonic Decision, 10 NAT'L L. 26 (Dec. 7, 1987).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Lawrence Feinberg, Court Backs Equal Benefits for GU Homosexual Groups, WASH.
PosT, Nov. 21, 1987, at Al.
223. University Gay Groups Win Equal Privileges,supra note 216 at 32.
224. Lawrence Feinberg, Court Backs Equal Benefits for GU Homosexual Groups, WASH.
PosT,Nov. 21, 1987, at Al.
225. Id.
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The Georgetown gay and lesbian community were just as eager
for a truce. They had always held faith, they said, that binding case
law, such as the Georgetown decision, would have a cause and effect
result. "The legal decision being the cause, would effectively change
discriminatory attitudes harbored by and overt acts committed by Georgetown faculty and students,' 2 2 6 their leaders hoped. At bottom,
probably most gay and lesbian students shared Father Healy's bruised
spirits: "This case has caused much divisiveness within the [Georgetown law school] community, and it is [Bi]LAGA's hope that now
a healing process can begin,"'22 7 wrote gay student leaders. "The future hope, now more a realistic one because of this significant decision, is that all members of the [Georgetown law school] community
can learn to respect and live with one another." 2"
Impressed by this unbroken chorus of victory, the National Law
Journal heaped biblical praise onto the Georgetown Decision. "In a
Solomonic decision," it marveled, "the District of Columbia's high
court has resolved one of the hottest gay rights cases in the country
with a ruling that has both sides claiming satisfaction."22 9 Arthur
Spitzer, the local ACLU director who broke ranks with his national
organization by filing an opposing amicus curiae brief in the case, was
impressed by the decision's effect although he detested its reasoning.
"I gather both sides are declaring victory," he remarked, "and I guess
that's good."" 0
According to attorney Gross and plaintiff Lorri Jean, the gay students were initially reluctant to argue the Mack position on appeal but
saw no other way to win the case after her initial dissent prompted the
en banc court to vacate the panel majority opinion and spontaneously
order rehearing before the full court. "They were ultimately delighted
that her position prevailed," reported Professor Eskridge."~ "Importantly, once Mack announced her judgment, both the students and the
university found her disaggregation liberating." 232 But as it turned
out, all these numerous sighs of relief came a moment too soon. Of all
the extensive media coverage of the case, the most telling was an obscure local editorial that appeared the following week in the Rocky
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
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Solomonic Decision, 10 NAT'L L. J.26 (Dec. 7, 1987).
ACLU v. ACLU, 10 LEGAL TnrAs 3 (Nov. 30, 1987).
Eskridge, A Jurisprudenceof "Coming Out", supra note 57, at 2437 n.109.
Id. at 2450 n.152.
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Mountain News of Denver, Colorado. 3 This editorial frowned on
the Georgetown decision. It said that the District's government was
allowing homosexual student groups at Georgetown University to
"pulverize the First Amendment guarantees of religious freedom." 4
William Armstrong, the Republican United States Senator from Colorado, read the editorial and some other articles about the case. He
was outraged. A conservative, born-again Christian, Senator Armstrong was incensed that a Catholic school was being forced to support
are sinful.
gay student groups whose activities the Church believes
5
Armstrong.23
Senator
railed
"That's un-American,"
Under both internal and external pressures, the Georgetown
community soon splintered in its reactions to the en banc decision, led
by the conflicting visions of Georgetown's Jesuit president Father
Timothy Healy, famous trial lawyer Edward Bennett Williams, law
school plaintiff and later lesbian activist Lorri Jean, the law faculty,
and competing factions of Georgetown's students, staff, faculty, and
alumni. Ultimately, however, the Georgetown board of trustees voted
not to petition for certiorari from the United States Supreme Court,
despite three letters urging them to resist Judge Mack's resolution
from local Cardinal James Hickey.
Without support from the university, Senator Armstrong nevertheless introduced two acts of Congress in successive years aimed at
negating Judge Mack's Georgetown opinion .3 6 These so-called Armstrong Amendments initially threatened to block approval of the District of Columbia's $3.2 billion budget (almost entirely raised from
local taxes) unless the elected local legislature amended the Human
Rights Act to insulate religious schools from the pioneering sexual
orientation antidiscrimination law.237 With this overt assault on District of Columbia home rule, the controversy moved from the campus
and the local government and judiciary into Congress and the federal
courts. The renewed controversy continued and even mounted in intensity. It was now led by anticolonial residents of the mostly AfricanAmerican District of Columbia who were faced with the shutdown of
their government by the unelected, mostly-white Congress. The Dis233. Religious Freedom Violated in Ruling, RocKY MTN. NEws, Nov. 27, 1987, reprinted in
134 CONG. Rac. S9109 (daily ed. July 8, 1988).
234. Id.
235. John Mintz & Eric Pianin, Colorado Lawmaker Put Beliefs into Action; Senator
Targeted Gay Rights in D.C. Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1988, at Cl.
236. See supra note 114.

237. Id.
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trict of Columbia's elected local legislators successfully challenged the
Armstrong Amendment on the First Amendment principle forbidding
compelled speech-an argument ironically identical to that successfully invoked by their erstwhile foe Georgetown University. After
this constitutional setback, Congress simply ignored home rule and
directly amended the District of Columbia Human Rights Act to permit religious schools to deny benefits to campus gay rights groups.
Nevertheless, Georgetown University, which did not support this uninvited intervention, disregarded Senator Armstrong's amendment to
the Human Rights Act, and accepted Judge Mack's decision. Despite
the Human Rights Act's subsequent amendment, Judge Mack's Georgetown decision remains the only final judicial precedent holding
that sexual orientation discrimination is suspect for equal protection
purposes.A s
Immediately after the Georgetown decision in late 1987 President
Healy enthusiastically supported the outcome as a fair reconciliation
between Georgetown University's spiritual mission and its civil obligations. Shortly thereafter, President Healy was overturned by Georgetown's executive board, which wanted more time to allow the
university to deliberate fully whether it should petition for certiorari
from the Supreme Court. Georgetown University requested a stay
which was initially denied by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals but was then temporarily granted by Chief Justice Rehnquist of
the Supreme Court. 9 Early in 1988, however, this temporary stay
was unanimously lifted by the full Supreme Court, with the conspicuous exception of Justice Scalia who disqualified himself.24 ° Newspapers speculated that Justice Scalia's recused himself because
Georgetown University is his undergraduate alma mater. However,
the reality was more complex.
238. Readers should recall that the subsequent amendment of the District of Columbia's
Human Rights Act does not alter the status of the Georgetown decision as a final and authoritative judicial precedent. Nor should readers be misled by occasional statements to the effect that
Georgetown University later "settled" the case with its gay student groups. These references
advert only to the fact that Georgetown ultimately chose not to petition for certiorari from the
federal Supreme Court, instead resolving its differences with the gay student groups on the terms
set forth in Judge Mack's Georgetown decision. Throughout, Georgetown has remained bound
by the final decision of the District of Columbia's highest court.
239. Lawrence Feinberg, GU sending to Block Ruling on Gay Rights, WASH. PoST, Dec. 24,
1987, at B1; Lawrence Feinberg, GU wins Delay on Gay Rights, WASH. PosT, Dec. 25, 1987, at
C8; Rehnquist Postpones Effect Of Ruling in Gay Rights Case, N.Y. Tnras, Dec. 25, 1987, at A18;
Gay Access case could go to Supreme Court, NAT'L L-J., Jan 11, 1988 at 8.
240. Georgetown Univ. v. Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 484 U.S. 999

(1988).
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Just after President Healy's public embrace of the Georgetown
decision and before the executive board intervention, Justice Scalia
was buttonholed at a reception by a representative from his old college. As a prominent member of Georgetown's board of advisers, Justice Scalia was urged to lend his support to school projects. Justice
Scalia flatly refused, declaring that he would never again do anything
for Georgetown University because it had decided not to appeal
Judge Mack's Georgetown decision. This remark was overheard by
several of those in attendance, and more recently its essence was confirmed by Justice Scalia himself: in a public speech, Justice Scalia declared that he resigned from the Georgetown University board of
advisers to protest its abandonment of its Catholic mission through its
acceptance of a student-funded homosexual group "supposedly imposed upon it by a questionable court decree, which it chose not to
appeal." 4 1 Having expressed this strong criticism immediately after
the Georgetown decision, Justice Scalia could not realistically participate in the case even after the university changed tack and began considering an appeal! It was inevitable that one of the partygoers would
have revealed Justice Scalia's announced position.
All this was more than a little ironic because Justice Scalia's unexplained recusal lost Georgetown University a vital ally on the
Supreme Court. The great difficulty of winning a majority in such circumstances was later cited by the school as one reason why it ultimately did not petition for certiorari. In the words of President
Healy, whose consistent support for the Georgetown decision finally
prevailed:
Justice Antonin Scalia recused himself from the discussion of the
stay and thus from the case. He is not obliged to give a reason, and
he did not. The press speculated that as an alumnus of Georgetown
he did not wish to be involved in the case. This left us facing an
eight-judge court, and everyone felt that this was not an ideal situation in which to approach the Supreme Court.242
By the end of these kaleidoscopically changing events, Georgetown
University had sacrificed $200 million in tax-exempt bonds rather than
241. Jeffrey Gold, Scalia, at Seton Halt Defines Mission of Catholic Universities, BUFF.
NEws, Mar. 6, 1997, at A8. See also David Gibson, Scalia:Avoid Secularism, THE RE-c., Mar. 6,
1997, at A3; Jeffery Gold, Associated PREss POL SERVICE (four documents), Mar. 5 & 6, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 2505966, 2505996, 2506558 & 2506577; Jay Johnston, Catholic Colleges Fail
in Mission, Scalia Says, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Mar. 6, 1997, at Al.
242. Timothy S. Healy, A Letter to the Alumni and Faculty of Georgetown, 158 AM. 455,458
(Apr. 30, 1988), reprintedin 134 CONG. REc. S9114 (daily ed. July 8, 1988), and 135 CONG. RC.
S11109 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 1989).
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abandon its religious heritage; the gay community had been judicially
elevated onto the same constitutionally protected status as blacks and
women, only to find its advance legislatively assailed by hostile Congressional legislative intervention; and the District of Columbia Council had chosen to risk its entire $3.2 billion budget to protect its
Human Rights Act in the face of colonial insults to its hard-won home
rule.
A historic narrative could address the role of collective ideals and
individual heroism in the making of law and examine the institutional
and societal constraints that make laws rigid or hostile to new social
thinking or emerging norms such as gay and lesbian equality. While
appreciating the elusive ideal of judicial objectivity, it might rely on
social movement theory to demonstrate that legal ideology Will reflect
emerging collective values and group politics. Much social movement
theory can be jurisprudentially challenged on the ground that victory
in the courtroom through impact litigation, as well as in other legal
battlegrounds through aggressive lobbying, is a vital prerequisite for
the legitimation of any emerging cause; such themes are conspicuously
absent from what is typically abstract jurisprudential discourse and
from work in related social sciences that often pays insufficient attention to the evolution of social norms through the powerful legitimating function of law. A sophisticated legal history of the Georgetown
gay rights conflict might also suggest a methodological critique of conventional legal scholarship which tends to confine itself to arid conceptualisms. In seeking to describe this complex sequence of events,
we might instead find that deeper and more complex jurisprudential
insights might flow from a more literary, nonlinear writing technique
embracing metaphor, ambiguity, and biography. Such a history of the
Georgetown gay rights conflict could contribute to legal philosophy by
empirically demonstrating the construction of jurisprudential values
from the bottom up as well as the top down; to political science by
showing the interplay between social movements and the institutional
public legitimation that comes from courts and Congress; to social science by focusing on the formation of normative ideals through identity politics that have dominated since the Civil Rights Era; to moral
philosophy by presenting the tension between the imperative of personal commitment and the unstable, relative nature of moral truths; to
theology by offering a detailed account of the agony of faith and action on the border between the church and the secular world; to communications and media studies by examining abundant evidence on
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the role of public information in the shaping of law and political discourse; to cultural criticism by engaging in complex analysis of a tough
culture war; and to hermeneutic theory through a multifold presentation of hotly contested interpretive problems, including personal and
institutional schisms over legal and church doctrine against a backdrop of sharp cultural conflict.
In sum, the Georgetown University gay rights conflict offers a
rich opportunity to explore the meaning of freedom, equality, and autonomy within an extraordinary collision of social, political, and jurisprudential forces. In this clash of ideals, the challenge of description
confounds comfortable assumptions about the possibility of objectivity in a modem liberal democracy. Multiple and incompatible truths
can perhaps be represented only through an internally unstable historiography acknowledging both the possibilities and the limitations of
postmodern thought.
V.

CONCLUSION

At the outset of this essay, I suggested that the extended hermeneutic debate on Judge Mack's Georgetown opinion-on campus,
within the Catholic community, within the gay, lesbian and bisexual
community, within the conservative religious community, in the legislatures, in the courts, and among the scholarly community-has yet to
touch upon some of its deepest implications. Her judicial background
reveals that, unlike many partisan observers who saw only clashing
interest groups, Judge Mack may never have perceived any real clash
of interests.
"Control of narratives is a crucial function of the state apparatus
since its political and legal frameworks can only gain consent and' le243
gitimacy if the tale they tell monopolizes the field of probabilities.
In her Georgetown opinion, in keeping with her iconoclastic professional career and her maverick judicial philosophy, Judge Mack used
her position of power to introduce two subversive narratives. One of
these respected the cultural integrity and social contribution of the
formerly suppressed Catholic community in a historically Protestant
and hostile nation. The other, and today more startling, narrative lent
early state support to the long-subordinated but now politically vocal
gay and lesbian minority. Judge Mack offered an alternative language
243. DAVID LLOYD, ANOMALOus STAEs: IRIsH WRITING AND THE POST-COLONIAL MoxmE" 6 (1993).
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in which to express the moral and jurisprudential claims of both communities, perceiving no ultimate incongruity between them. In doing
so, she anticipated that "the state does not simply legislate and police
against particular infringements, it determines the forms within which
representation can take place." 2" Judge Mack simply refused to accept state imposed legal hierarchies and divisions which we constantly
reproduce and justify by associating them with an illusory social
reality.
Unlike Judge Mack, most courts seldom question the expedient
historical origins and resulting illegitimacy of such dominant legal hierarchies and divisions. Closer inspection curiously shows that there
is little substance to the conventional opposition between the supposedly competing ideals of religious freedom and gay rights. Religious
freedom and gay rights are not only interdependent upon each other,
but each concept gives renewed strength and coherence to our peculiarly American struggle to achieve racial equality.
Following Judge Mack's methodology, we can reach these insights
by examining the roots of discrimination and persecution as a recurring phenomenon across human cultures. Historical inquiry reveals
that the social and legal position of the gay and lesbian community
today bears a remarkable similarity to that of Roman Catholics
throughout the colonial period and well into the new republic. The
historic disenfranchisement of Catholics as well as gays and lesbians in
overlapping periods of this country's history has taken place concurrent with the racial subordination of African-Americans based on skin
color. Persecution based on religion, sexual orientation, and race
were all embodied in this nation's imperial, colonial laws. Current efforts to overcome such antirepublican hierarchies must rest on a better understanding of common histories of exclusion, and selfperpetuating social consequences of such reprehensible legal ideologies. American Catholics, typically racialized ethnic minorities beginning with the Irish refugees who crowded into nineteenth-century
urban ghettos, have ultimately risen through stages of grudging toleration from colonial proscription to ultimate legal equality. AfricanAmericans, too, have risen from colonial chattel slavery through various periods of diminishing legal exclusions to their present position of
formal but not yet actual social equality. And gay men and lesbians
have today largely overcome the proscription of sodomy laws to
244. Id.
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achieve widespread social tolerance, with hopes of real equality in the
coming century.
As we step into the next millennium, Judge Mack's Georgetown
opinion stands as a powerful early judicial affirmation of the mutually
reinforcing quality of these moral imperatives and places them within
a remarkably expansive vision of antidiscrimination theory. We cannot demand for ourselves what we would deny to others. Judge Mack
dares to frame the fearful symmetry of gay rights, religious freedom,
and racial equality.
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